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Michael Levi and Peter Reuter
Money Laundering
ABSTRACT
Techniques for hiding proceeds of crime include transporting cash out of
the country, purchasing businesses through which funds can be channeled,
buying easily transportable valuables, transfer pricing, and using “under-
ground banks.” Since the mid-1980s, governments and law enforcement
have developed an increasingly global, intrusive, and routinized set of
measures to affect criminal revenues passing through the ﬁnancial system.
Except at an anecdotal level, the effects of this system on laundering
methods and prices, or on offenders’ willingness to engage in various
crimes, are unknown. Available data weakly suggest that the anti–money
laundering (AML) regime has not had major effects in suppressing crimes.
The regime does facilitate investigation and prosecution of some criminal
participants who would otherwise evade justice, but fewer than expected
by advocates of “follow the money” methods. It also permits the readier
recovery of funds from core criminals and from ﬁnancial intermediaries.
However, the volume is very slight compared with income or even proﬁts
from crime. Though the regime also targets terrorist ﬁnances, modern
terrorists need little money for their operations. AML controls are un-
likely to cut off their funds but may yield useful intelligence. Money-laun-
dering controls impose costly obligations on businesses and society: they
merit better analysis of their effects, both good and bad.
People who commit serious crimes for economic gain want not only
to evade imprisonment but also to enjoy the fruits of their crimes. This
enjoyment often takes the form of immediate (sometimes conspicuous)
consumption. For the more disciplined and those who make vast prof-
its, “enjoyment” may take the form of savings for future economic
opportunities. The latter group (plus transnational criminals who have
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to move funds before spending them), how they do their business, and
how public and private sectors respond around the world are the focus
of this essay.
The conversion of criminal incomes to forms that allow the offender
unfettered spending and investment has been an ongoing concern to
both criminals and the state since at least the early days of the Amer-
ican Maﬁa. Meyer Lansky’s claim to fame was partly his supposed skill
in concealing the origins of funds used to buy real estate and legitimate
businesses. His goal was to avoid tax evasion charges, which had fa-
mously brought down Al Capone, by making it difﬁcult to trace the
connection between wealth and its criminal sources.1 Laws against han-
dling stolen property traditionally referred only to the physical prop-
erty obtained in the course of the crime. Only in the last generation
has the disguise or concealment of funds obtained from crimes itself
become a criminal activity, in a sense created by a new set of laws and
regulations aimed at “money laundering.”
Developed initially in the United States in the 1970s to combat use
of international banks for tax evasion, money-laundering controls be-
came a signiﬁcant component of the war on drugs. More recently they
have grown into an extensive and global set of controls aimed at a wide
array of offenses, from cigarette smuggling, through corruption of
high-level ofﬁcials, to terrorist ﬁnance. The extent to which money-
laundering laws include tax evasion remains an issue of divergence,
both in national legislation and in mutual legal assistance.
The array of institutions involved in anti–money laundering (AML)
is impressive. The control regime in the United States has extended
beyond banks,2 the original subjects, to a wide range of businesses such
as car dealers, casinos, corner shop money transmission businesses,
jewelers, pawnbrokers, and certain insurance companies. All these are
now required3 to play an active role in crime control through, inter
alia, reporting on those customers whom they suspect of obtaining
funds from crime or of using funds (whether from crime or legitimate
sources) for terrorist activities. In the United Kingdom, any business
handling high-value goods must report a “suspicious transaction.”4 In
1 Mark Haller provided helpful clarifying comments on this matter.
2 There were also some other regulated retail savings ﬁrms.
3 Garland (1996) offers an inelegant but evocative term, “responsibilized,” that might
be used for this.
4 Technically, these should be labeled “suspected transactions,” since they represent the
aftermath of a cognitive process rather than an inherent quality of the act. But as Gold
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Canada there have been moves to require accountants to afﬁrmatively
report any suspicions of money laundering by their clients, though
analogous requirements for lawyers had to be withdrawn following
constitutional attack. In Switzerland, long regarded by the media and
by anticorruption campaigners as an iconic laundering nation, even
hotels that offer money exchange facilities above a modest level are
subject to money-laundering regulation and are required to identify
customers and record dealings.
The regime aims to be truly global, with both the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank playing an active role
within a policy framework set by a “temporary body” with a renewable
mandate created in 1989—the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
They and a myriad of regional bodies monitor how well each nation
complies with at least the formalities (and, increasingly, the substance)
of the regime (Levi and Gilmore 2002). Thus, from small beginnings
in 1995, by November 2005, the Egmont Group contained 101 Na-
tional Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that meet internally devel-
oped criteria for receiving, analyzing, and processing reports (including
Suspicious Activity Reports [SARs]) from the regulated institutions
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Since 1999, there has been a
formal process for imposing economic sanctions on countries that do
not play their part, by slowing down their international transactions
and making it almost impossible for their banks to clear funds through
other countries. There is considerable pressure to expand the regime
to other businesses and professions throughout the world, mostly jus-
tiﬁed since 9/11 as a method for ﬁghting terrorism. Given the small
sums involved as direct operational costs in major incidents such as the
Madrid bombing of 2004 and the London bombings of July 2005 (not
much more than $10,000 in total), it is difﬁcult to predict where this
broadening of coverage will end.
Money laundering is difﬁcult to study in part because it is concep-
tually elusive. Is it a separate activity, like the fencing of stolen goods,
or is it better thought of as an element of certain criminal acts, as is
conspiracy? There appears to be a disjunction between the legal con-
struct of laundering, which includes acts as modest as the placing of
proceeds of crime in a bank account in one’s own name, and the an-
and Levi (1994) note, it is difﬁcult to shift even misleading terminology once it has
entered into routine use. Another example of this might be the continued use of the term
“organized crime.”
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alytical construct of laundering, which one would expect to mean the
sanitizing of proceeds of crime so that one can spend the funds as
though they had been acquired legitimately. Most crimes for signiﬁcant
gain generate more funds than their perpetrators can spend in cash in
the short term, and storing large sums creates risks from law enforce-
ment and from other criminal predators. In that sense laundering (or
at least “hiding,” which has become “laundering” through legal exten-
sion of the concept) is an integral part of the serious crime process.
But how distinct is the process from the commission of the under-
lying “predicate” crimes? There certainly are persons uninvolved in
the underlying crime who have laundered money. For example, Lucy
Edwards—a senior executive in charge of Eastern European operations
at the Bank of New York—and her husband, businessman Peter Berlin,
earned large sums by laundering billions of dollars for some Russians
who were either evading taxes or concealing the fruits of criminal en-
terprise. They have no other connection to criminal activities.5 How-
ever, in many instances—especially fraud and tax evasion—the act is
built into the underlying criminal offense. In accusations against Enron
(Andrew Fastow) and HealthSouth (Richard Scrushy),6 senior execu-
tives were charged with money laundering as well as fraud and em-
bezzlement; but these cases currently involve no person who is charged
with having acted as their money launderer. Pragmatically, enforce-
ment authorities may ﬁnd it useful to be able to charge people with
laundering or (in the United States) with structuring payments in order
to avoid reporting regulations (discussed later), even where the laun-
derer is in fact the person committing a substantive offense such as
drug trafﬁcking or robbery.7
Knowing the balance between laundering as a separate activity and
as part of the offense is important in judging the likely effectiveness of
the AML regime. If the same evidence that might be used to convict
people of laundering could also convict them of a substantive offense,
there is little marginal beneﬁt from the existence of the offense. There
could be a beneﬁt, however, where suspicious transaction reports from
institutions point the ﬁnger of suspicion or lead to greater asset re-
5 For a particularly graphic approach to this and other misconduct, see Block and
Weaver (2004).
6 Richard Scrushy was found not guilty of these charges.
7 These laundering sanctions penalize only savers, since if all proceeds are spent on
immediate conspicuous consumption, the principal offenders have not laundered the
money.
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covery, or where there is court-usable evidence of their connection to
the banking or concealment of the proceeds but not of their involve-
ment in the speciﬁc offenses that generated the funds. Measuring that
beneﬁt is important because the costs of the AML system, in a number
of dimensions, are very substantial and are easier to see than the ben-
eﬁts. Indeed, although the costs are normally calculated in terms of
the economic costs of implementing the policies, part of the resistance
to AML comes from the emotional and practical experiences of ordi-
nary citizens who may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to open accounts because they
lack the identiﬁcation documents in their own names required by the
money-laundering regulations, even though their intended business is
small and not remotely connected to the transnational crime activity
with which they (and our readers) associate the term “money launder-
ing.”8
The problem faced by the regime is easily described. By the early
twenty-ﬁrst century (and long before), there was a large and growing
range of methods for moving money across international boundaries,
yet another facet of globalization. Thus there has evolved a highly
differentiated set of ﬁnancial institutions to meet the needs of various
population groups such as low-income migrant workers who repatriate
earnings home to poorer countries, very rich investors seeking to ﬁnd
the most politically secure and proﬁtable location for their capital, and
a broad array of businesses, from jewelry shops and car dealers to ﬁ-
nancial services ﬁrms themselves.
This makes it difﬁcult to develop regulations that are truly compre-
hensive across institutions and that also reﬂect the risk to society that
those different sorts of institutions pose through money-laundering
activities. Though ultimately banks will almost certainly be involved in
handling the proceeds of crimes or (to a far lesser extent) funds that
facilitate terrorism, the chains by which the funds reach banks may
themselves be complicated enough to make it hard for even well-
intentioned banks to identify truly suspect transactions. Not all banks
8 Thus, even when trying to open a new account for children in the same institution
in which they already held accounts, one of us (ML) was required to get them to prove
their identities by showing passports etc. Bankers we have interviewed have experienced
this when trying to open accounts for themselves, even in their own institutions. Little
wonder that some senior citizens and married people (usually women) whose utility bills
are in their partner’s name write to the British press complaining about being treated as
money-laundering suspects and denied access to the banking system. This reﬂects the
focus of the authorities on the front end of the due diligence process rather than on the
ongoing monitoring of accounts.
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are so well intentioned; but the AML regime has increased the repu-
tational, regulatory, and penal risks attached to such commercial my-
opia or sociopathy.
We cannot dismiss the possibility that the regime’s many critics are
correct. Whatever their beneﬁts in theory, the controls in practice may
do little to accomplish crime-ﬁghting goals or to combat terrorism,
while imposing a substantial burden on people doing business in those
nations—by now the vast majority—that have introduced them. The-
oretical arguments suggest the implausibility of large crime suppression
effects from AML, and our review of the little available data weakly
supports this view, at least given the resources (including their coor-
dination) that have been put into AML so far.9 The regime does fa-
cilitate investigation and prosecution of some criminal participants who
would otherwise evade justice, but fewer than expected and hoped for
by advocates of “follow the money” methods. It also permits the read-
ier recovery of funds from core criminals and from ﬁnancial interme-
diaries and their transfer to victims and law enforcement agencies.
However, although this may make communities feel better, the volume
is slight compared with total income or even plausible proﬁts from
crime.
There is very little empirical research either on the phenomenon of
money laundering or on the controls that deal with it. In particular,
despite regular intergovernmental reviews of “money-laundering ty-
pologies” at FATF and regional gatherings—which at least stimulate
some communal thinking about vulnerabilities—there are no system-
atic studies of how criminal offenders turn their incomes into usable
assets or of how AML controls affect this. This essay draws not only
on the modest criminological and legal literature but also on a wide
array of nonacademic writings, principally from governments, lawyers,
and journalists, to describe both money laundering and the regime.
Our emphasis is as much on the regulations as on the offense. The
reason is not just that more is known about the regulations but also
that the regulations have signiﬁcant consequences for the architecture
of the national and international governance of serious crime and for
its ﬂip side—the freedom of citizens from government surveillance.
Section I reviews the evolution of the regime of controls in the
United States and summarizes the current global regime. It emphasizes
9 It is far from certain that additional AML resources would have a signiﬁcant effect
on crime suppression.
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the intricacy of the laws and regulations, the institutional complexity,
and the multiplicity of goals. Section II describes what is known about
money laundering itself. Though the regime has been justiﬁed in large
part by the claim that money launderers are an important class of crim-
inal offenders who facilitate certain illegal markets, organized crime,
and white-collar crime, we offer some indications that self-laundering
is the common mode. The section also reviews estimates of the scale
of money laundering, since the claim of macroeconomic signiﬁcance
has been an important plank in the construction of the controls. Sec-
tion III reviews available information on enforcement, which has been
given much less policy attention than the laws and regulations them-
selves. Section IV provides an analytic framework linking the regime
to the general goals and analyzes the patchy data available for the
United States to suggest that if the volumes of money laundered are
of the magnitude conventionally quoted, those involved are at modest
risk of being caught. Section V gives our conclusions about how well
the system works and brieﬂy lays out a short research agenda, a set of
interesting theoretical and policy questions, and some suggestions for
how they might be studied.
I. The Anti–Money Laundering Regime
The current AML regime is remarkable for the range of institutions
involved and the centrality of international agreements. AWorld Bank/
IMF guide to the system (World Bank 2003a) lists six distinct inter-
national bodies in addition to themselves that either set rules or have
formal monitoring responsibilities,10 mostly either for speciﬁc indus-
tries (such as insurance) or for parts of the process (e.g., FIUs that
receive reports from regulated institutions). Alldridge (2003, p. 281)
10 The bodies are the FATF, the Egmont Group of FIUs, the InternationalOrganization
of Security Commissioners, the United Nations Ofﬁce of Drugs and Crime, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Association of Insurance Su-
pervisors. These are merely the top layer of standard-setting bodies: there is a myriad
of subsidiary public- and private-sector bodies beneath, including the FATF-style regional
bodies: Asia/Paciﬁc Group, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, ESAAMLG
(Eastern and Southern Africa), EAG (Eurasia), GAFISUD (Latin America), MENAFATF
(Middle East and North Africa), andMoneyval (Europe). The Offshore Group of Banking
Supervisors is also part of this network. In the private sector there are national industry
and professional bodies (such as the American Bankers Association and the Law Society
of England andWales), plus the Wolfsberg group of international banks. This collectively
constitutes an important component of the governance of crime, though omitted by some
recent contributors to discussions of “high policing” (such as O’Reilly and Ellison,
forthcoming).
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notes that money laundering “is an area in which most jurisdictions’
laws are formulated in order to comply with international instru-
ments.” However, this international regime has developed only since
1989. How did it begin?
The U.S. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 represents the historic
starting point for efforts to detect and sanction money laundering,
though the term was not yet commonly used. The irony of the name
is frequently noted (e.g., Cue´llar 2003); the statute was intended to
limit rather than protect bank secrecy. Banks acquired an afﬁrmative
duty to provide information to the Department of the Treasury of
transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash (Currency Transac-
tion Reports [CTRs]). In line with its “regulatory” thrust, the BSA
criminalized the failure to report, not the provision of the services to
facilitate a criminal act.
The BSA was aimed primarily at the use of foreign banks to launder
the proceeds of illegal activity and to evade federal income taxes (Villa
1988). Though passed at the beginning of the federal government cam-
paign against the American Maﬁa (Jacobs and Gouldin 1999), the BSA
appears not to have been motivated by that effort. Nor indeed (like
RICO11 itself) was it much used until the 1980s, when the powers of
the Department of Treasury were clariﬁed and extended by passage of
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, whose key provisions (18
CFR 1956 and 1957) remain the principal statutory authorities for
prosecutions.
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was explicitly a com-
ponent of the federal war on drugs, stimulated in part by the ﬁndings
of a high-proﬁle undercover investigation in the center of the drug
trade, southern Florida. Operation Greenback found numerous in-
stances of couriers for drug dealers carrying cash into banks in quan-
tities just under $10,000 in order to evade the formal requirements of
the BSA. Following the prosecution of the Bank of Boston for failure
to report such patterns of transactions, many banks voluntarily re-
ported noncompliance with the BSA and implemented much more
routinized reporting programs:12 an early instance of deterrence among
those who had much to lose.
11 The Racketeer-Inﬂuenced Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 was passed as part of
President Nixon’s war on organized crime (see Woodiwiss 2001) to try to put into legal
effect the criminal enterprise construct and to permit a range of civil and criminal controls.
12 This illustrates the power of high-proﬁle enforcement activity to trigger behavioral
changes among other institutions that have something to lose. Whether, after the oc-
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Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the system had
expanded to include terrorism ﬁnance, though efforts to require bank-
ers to be more diligent in identifying and monitoring their customers
had met with severe political setbacks. Following the attack, Congress
hastily passed the USA PATRIOT Act,13 which increased the powers
of the Departments of Justice and Treasury to obtain information and
to expand the net of regulation. For example, the PATRIOT Act al-
lowed (but did not require) the Treasury Department to regulate those
involved in securities transactions, currency exchange, fund transfers,
and real estate closings and settlements, among others. The act also
imposed new requirements on ﬁnancial institutions, including stricter
customer due diligence and the creation of AML programs within each
institution.
It is useful to think of the regime as having two basic pillars, pre-
vention and enforcement. The prevention pillar is designed to deter
criminals from using institutions to launder the proceeds of their
crimes and to create sufﬁcient transparency to deter institutions from
being willing to launder. Enforcement is designed to punish criminals
(and their money-laundering associates) when, despite prevention ef-
forts, they have successfully laundered those proceeds.
The prevention pillar has four key elements from bottom to top:
customer due diligence (CDD), reporting, regulation and supervision,
and sanctions (ﬁg. 1). Prevention may be thought of as describing pri-
marily the role of regulatory agencies. CDD involves the requirements
to name not just the nominal account holder but also the beneﬁcial
owner on whose behalf she or he is acting;14 to provide proof of iden-
tity and an address; and ongoing monitoring to check whether indi-
vidual and corporate customer account behavior is consistent with the
bank’s knowledge of their circumstances and work. This is intended to
limit criminal access to the ﬁnancial system and—latterly—to generate
continuous reconsideration of whether customers might be beneﬁting
from crime or ﬁnancing terrorism. The theory is that the requirement
to provide information will deter some offenders and others will be
denied access once the information has been checked. Reporting refers
casional symbolic shock, criminal prosecution is always necessary to achieve this is open
to question, however.
13 USA Patriot Act stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”
14 Though variably implemented in national legislation and in national regulatory
supervision.
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to information that the institution or professional must provide to en-
forcement authorities. External supervision is active monitoring of
compliance with CDD and reporting requirements. Finally, sanctions
(mostly administrative and civil rather than criminal) punish individuals
and institutions that fail to implement the prevention regime, in par-
ticular with respect to CDD and reporting requirements.
The enforcement pillar also has four key elements from bottom to
top: a list of underlying offenses or predicate crimes, investigation,
prosecution and punishment, and conﬁscation (ﬁg. 1). The list of pred-
icate crimes establishes the legal basis for criminalizing money laun-
dering; only funds from the listed crimes are subject to these laws and
regulations. The other three elements are common in the criminal
justice system, except for conﬁscation of proceeds, where often the
burden of proof shifts following some early legal elements such as
conviction. Enforcement may be triggered or facilitated by information
from the prevention apparatus, but it is primarily carried out by crim-
inal investigative agencies.
A. The Current U.S. Anti–Money Laundering Prevention Regime
The U.S. prevention pillar, much imitated because of its pioneering
status and because of the U.S. centrality to international ﬁnances (e.g.,
clearing most dollar-denominated trades), is more elaborate and has
evolved more than the enforcement pillar. In practice, there may be
some tension between the two pillars. For example, ﬁnancial supervi-
sory authorities are uncomfortable with the delays in changing behav-
ior that arise when institutions (and their lawyers and insurers) shift
from “restorative” to defensive criminal justice mode and with the col-
lateral damage to the ﬁnancial system that may arise from prosecuting
major institutions. A criminal indictment of a bank threatens the in-
stitution’s existence, as happened to the Arthur Andersen accounting
ﬁrm when it was indicted for obstructing justice in the investigation of
Enron.15 Bank supervisors, while willing to admonish, are interested in
the continued existence of the banks they regulate unless the banks are
insolvent; they may be fearful that if they hand over information to
15 Though the Arthur Andersen conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court in May
2005, the accounting ﬁrm remains a mere shell of its former self, and its staff worldwide
mostly moved to other accounting ﬁrms. However, the consequences of the Arthur An-
dersen case are a public warning of how quickly major institutions can unravel—a factor
that may deter regulatory as well as criminal intervention and sanctions since they are
seen as the “nuclear option.”
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
300 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter
TABLE 1
Prevention Pillar of the U.S. Anti–Money Laundering Regime
CDD
Reporting
Requirements Supervision Sanction
Financial institutions:
Core ﬁnancial
institutions* Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other types of ﬁ-
nancial
institutions Yes Yes Some Limited
Nonﬁnancial busi-
nesses:
Casinos Yes Yes Some Yes
Dealers in precious
metals and
stones Yes Yes No No
Real estate agents No No No No
Other† No Some No No
Professions:
Lawyers and
accountants Limited Limited Very limited Very limited
Trust and company
services
providers Limited Limited Very limited Very limited
Other‡ Some Some Very limited Very limited
SOURCE.—Reuter and Truman (2004).
* Depository institutions, securities ﬁrms, insurance companies, and combinations.
† For example, mutual funds and investment advisors.
‡ For example, travel agencies, commodity trading advisors, and vehicle sellers.
prosecutors, there will be systemic or other “collateral damage,” for
example, to bank customers.
Table 1 summarizes the prevention pillar of the current U.S. AML
regime. The elements are listed across the top of the table, and three
broad categories of economic actors (along with some subcategories)
are listed down the side. The cells in the table indicate whether or to
what extent the elements of the prevention pillar are applied to the
various subcategories of economic activities. This heterogeneity is im-
portant for understanding the limits of the system.
1. Core Financial Institutions. The most stringent requirements ap-
ply to core ﬁnancial institutions such as banks, securities ﬁrms, insur-
ance companies, and various combinations of those institutions. All are
required to have comprehensive AML compliance programs (a formal
set of controls and training programs) and are traditionally subject to
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federal as well as state regulation and supervision.16 These include four
different forms.
a. Customer due diligence. If the institution is unable to satisfy itself
that the clients are who they say they are and that their funds are
plausibly consistent with what it knows about their inheritance
and current sources of income, it is generally expected to decline
to open the account or to complete the transaction. The insti-
tution is expected to view due diligence as an ongoing process. If
an individual suddenly deposits a million dollars in her account,
especially in cash, she had better have a veriﬁable explanation;
otherwise the bank will send an SAR to the government.17
b. Reporting requirements. In the United States, institutions are re-
quired to submit a variety of reports on transactions to federal
agencies.18 These reports generate an information overload, mak-
ing it difﬁcult for the recipient agencies to use the information
efﬁciently in law enforcement and related investigatory activi-
ties.19 Interinstitutional variations in reporting behavior are com-
monplace worldwide, with some engaging in defensive reporting
to avoid potential penalties (and reduce internal review staff costs)
and others sifting carefully their initial suspicions, thereby risking
criticism and even ofﬁcial action for failing to disclose. The U.S.
AML regime and core ﬁnancial institutions have also been criti-
cized for applying more stringent CDD and reporting require-
ments to foreign than to domestic customers and transactions,
possibly on the theory that drug trafﬁckers and other major crim-
inals are likely to be aliens.
c. Supervision. Core ﬁnancial institutions such as banks are subject
to substantial supervision that normally includes annual on-site
16 Stand-alone U.S. insurance companies are primarily supervised at the state level but
are covered by federal AML law and subject to federal AML regulations.
17 Some economies, e.g., in the Middle East, Asia, and even Switzerland, have much
higher rates of cash usage than the United Kingdom and United States; so this sort of
“out-of-context” behavior has to be seen in the light of business and social norms—a
ﬂexibility that is difﬁcult to reconcile with the pressure for uniform international rules.
18 SARs go to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes EnforcementNetwork
(FinCEN), CTRs to the Internal Revenue Service, and Reports of International Trans-
portation of Currency or Other Monetary Instruments to the Customs Service.
19 In mid-2004, the American Bankers Association acknowledged that progress had
been made in reducing the amount of data generated but recommended that the threshold
for banks to ﬁle CTRs for corporations and businesses be at least doubled from the
$10,000 set in 1970 (Byrne 2004).
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examinations to ensure their compliance with a wide array of laws
and regulations.
d. Sanctions. Institutions can be subjected to informal or formal ad-
ministrative actions by the regulator and, potentially, civil and
criminal penalties. There have been a few major scandals, such as
that concerning the Riggs Bank of Washington in 2004 (U.S.
Senate 2004, 2005) after it failed to conduct due diligence in-
quiries on large ﬂows into accounts connected with ex-President
Pinochet of Chile and President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea.
Following this, it was ﬁned heavily ($25 million for regulatory
violations and $16 million for criminal violations) and placed un-
der a ﬁve-year probation.20 Dutch Bank ABN AMRO was ﬁned
$80 million in 2005 for allowing individuals from Russia and
other former Soviet republics to move $3.2 billion to shell com-
panies21 in the United States from August 2002 to September
2003 and for failing to stop Chicago and New York branches from
participating in wire transfers and trade transactions from 1997
to 2004 that violated economic sanctions on Libya and Iran (New
York Times 2005). Israel Discount Bank of New York agreed to
pay up to $25 million to settle state and federal claims that it
allowed illegal Brazilian money transmitters to move $2.2 billion
through its ofﬁces over the preceding ﬁve years (Newsday 2005).
The public has not been informed about what JP Morgan Chase
has agreed to do in the aftermath of its failure to catch the laun-
dering of $6 billion by the Beacon Hill money service business.
2. Noncore Financial Institutions. A broad range of other types of
U.S. ﬁnancial institutions has been progressively incorporated into the
U.S. AML regime. Money service businesses, a major subcategory of
“money management activities,”22 are required to register with
FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a small specialized
agency within the Department of Treasury) if they offer such services
20 Pinochet was charged by prosecutors in Chile in November 2005 in relation to
accounts allegedly held in Riggs under false names, contrary to Chilean law. Riggs itself
subsequently merged with PNC Bank.
21 Shell companies are companies that have little or no underlying genuine substantive
business but are mainly fronts for hiding or laundering funds.
22 FATF’s Forty Recommendations (2003) for combating money laundering and ter-
rorist ﬁnancing ﬁnesse this problem by deﬁning a ﬁnancial institution as any person or
entity that conducts as a business activities or operations in one or more of a list of
thirteen categories of activities, some with multiple subparts.
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as money orders, traveler’s checks, money transmission, check cashing,
or currency dealing or exchange. These U.S. ﬁnancial institutions are
subject to CDD and reporting requirements that are essentially the
same as those applied to core ﬁnancial institutions, but they are not
subject to systematic or comprehensive supervision. In principle, they
can be sanctioned either criminally or civilly for not complying with
the requirements of AML regulations, but, in practice, the sanctions
element of the prevention pillar as it applies to these ﬁnancial insti-
tutions is extremely limited; sanctions will be applied only if suspected
offenders are already under surveillance or in the aftermath of an in-
vestigation.
3. Nonﬁnancial Businesses. The prevention pillar of the U.S. AML
regime is even less rigorous for nonﬁnancial businesses such as casinos,
dealers in precious metals and stones, and real estate agents than it is
for noncore ﬁnancial institutions. With respect to CDD, they are sub-
ject to reasonable procedures such as identity checks, record keeping,
and determining whether customers are on lists of known or suspected
terrorists; but supervision of their compliance and any practical use of
sanctions for enforcement are limited because businesses are licensed
in state or local jurisdictions. Aside from withdrawing licenses as the
result of criminal or civil proceedings against the business, the au-
thorities have little leverage to supervise the CDD or reporting re-
quirements or to punish noncompliance.
Table 1 singles out three categories of nonﬁnancial businesses (ca-
sinos, dealers in precious metals, and real estate brokers) because they
are speciﬁcally identiﬁed in the FATF’s 2003 revision of its Forty Rec-
ommendations (FATF 2003). Recommendation 20 also states that
“countries should consider applying the FATF Recommendations to
businesses and professions, other than designated non-ﬁnancial busi-
nesses and professions, that pose a money laundering or terrorist ﬁ-
nancing risk.” Note that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd many business and ﬁnan-
cial activities that pose no risk at all, raising (in our minds) the issue
of what might be meant by a risk-based approach to money laundering:
there is a danger of confusing the risk of being sanctioned by regulators
or prosecutors with the risk of actual laundering.
Other nonﬁnancial businesses covered to some degree by the U.S.
AML regime include travel agents as well as pawnbrokers, telegraph
operators, and businesses involved in vehicle, boat, auto, and airplane
sales. The regime does not currently cover other businesses sometimes
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involved in high-value transactions, such as stamp dealers. The line has
to be drawn at some point, even if it is moved later.
4. Professions. FATF’s 2003 revision of its Forty Recommendations
called for extending the prevention pillar of the global AML regime
to lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, accountants,
and trust and company service providers, insofar as they are engaged
in speciﬁed activities.23 However, the United States has no preventative
CDD or AML reporting requirements that apply to them at present
beyond criminal enforcement risks arising from violation of CTR re-
quirements and assisting money laundering. Nor does it have any self-
regulatory bodies to which it could delegate preventative responsibil-
ities as per recommendation 24b of the FATF (2003).24 In their critique
of the equality of the international playing ﬁeld on AML, Pieth and
Aiolﬁ (2003, p. 27) comment that “it would rather stretch the general
meaning of the words self-regulation or ‘risk-based approach’” to sub-
ject attorneys, notaries, and unregulated ﬁduciaries to this type of reg-
ulation.
B. The Global Anti–Money Laundering Regime
The global AML regime has evolved rapidly over the past ﬁfteen
years. Despite the push for a “level playing ﬁeld,” there are big differ-
ences on a lengthy continuum between, at one extreme, regimes that
try to capture vast amounts of ﬁnancial activity data (most notably
Australia, Canada, and the United States) and use them to sift suspi-
cious behavior and at the other extreme, regimes such as Austria, Ger-
many, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland, that see reporting of suspicions
as focused on immediate criminal investigation, where the making of
a report automatically freezes the account for several days while the
prosecutor takes time to decide whether to open a formal money-laun-
dering investigation. Regimes are more similar at the front end (CDD)
than at the back end (such as reporting requirements and how reports
are handled).
While the current global regime has been shaped and prodded to a
considerable extent by U.S. developments and initiatives, national re-
gimes reﬂect other local inﬂuences as well. For example, the principal
23 The recommendations were an outgrowth of the so-called Gatekeepers Initiative
agreed to at the Group of Eight Moscow Ministerial Conference in October 1999.
24 For some European comparisons of lawyer regulation, see the special issue of Crime,
Law and Social Change (Levi, Nelen, and Lankhorst 2005).
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concern that prompted establishment of the Australian AML regime
in 1990 was tax evasion rather than drugs. In the United Kingdom,
concerns about drugs and Irish terrorism dominated in the 1980s. In-
ﬂuenced by the U.S. focus on coopting the ﬁnancial services sector,
drug trafﬁcking suspicions were required to be reported from 1987,
even though comprehensive all-crimes money-laundering regulations
did not go into effect until 1994.25
Switzerland is an example of a national AML regime that evolved
quite differently from the U.S. regime. The Swiss trace their concern
with money laundering to adoption of a code of conduct by the Swiss
Bankers Association in 1977 in the wake of the Chiasso banking scan-
dals, which began as simple fraud in the early 1960s and ended up a
major ﬁnancial and embarrassment problem for Credit Suisse and
much of the rest of the Swiss banking system.26 The Swiss approach
emphasizes deep knowledge of customers, well justiﬁed in a banking
system heavily oriented toward private banking for high–net worth
individuals and toward investment management rather than mass retail
banking.
The Swiss system also relies heavily on the integrity and responsi-
bility of ﬁnancial institutions to ensure compliance with national AML
laws and regulations. In contrast, although British and American banks
also have signiﬁcant “wealth management” private banking operations,
the U.S. and U.K. AML regimes operate in ﬁnancial systems in which
retail transactions are at least as important as wholesale transactions
and asset management relationships.27 Pieth and Aiolﬁ (2003) have
characterized the U.S. and U.K. AML regimes as emphasizing the col-
lection and submission of data to national authorities as part of an
“early warning system” that may produce little more than information
25 However, it was not until the end of the twentieth century that the U.K. Inland
Revenue got access to SARs.
26 In the early 1960s, the Credit Suisse Chiasso branch manager set up an offshore
trustee company, ofﬁcially managed and controlled by an outside third-party legal ofﬁce.
This provided the Chiasso branch manager with a medium to externalize branch losses
and a vehicle to circumvent headquarters controls on loans and investments, reporting
continuously high proﬁts while concealing signiﬁcant losses. It was also acting as a conduit
for Italian tax evaders.
27 So important are retail transactions to the U.K. ﬁnancial system that the AML regime
is sensitive to the charge that the regime itself may impede access to retail ﬁnancial
services by making it too difﬁcult for people without many genuine items (such as utility
bills and passports) that might evidence identity to satisfy customer identiﬁcation re-
quirements. For example, the U.K. CDD regulations contain a subsection providing
guidance about application of the regulations to limit ﬁnancial exclusion.
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overload. Though true, this may not reﬂect sufﬁciently the origin of
the Anglo-American systems in aiming at street- and wholesale-level
drug dealing in national markets, rather than the grander corruption
and frauds whose primary offenses were usually committed abroad that
gave rise to the Swiss reputational risks and control system.
1. Financial Action Task Force. Prior to 1989, few countries had ex-
plicit AML controls. At the Paris Economic Summit of the Group of
Seven (G-7) in 1989, France and the United States proposed an ini-
tiative that led to establishment of the FATF, agreeing at this time that
it would not address tax issues, thereby enabling the Swiss to join in.
For the United States this was an important front in the war on drugs,
then at or near its height. Through successive revisions in 1990, 1996,
and 2003, the FATF recommendations have been accepted as key
global standards for AML.
The FATF has a small secretariat (a budget of only about $3 million
in 2005) and limited membership28 and operates by consensus. It has
addressed these latter constraints by ensuring that its standard setting
for its members remains dynamic and by directly or indirectly spon-
soring a number of semi-autonomous FATF-style regional bodies.
Both the FATF and the regional bodies sponsor “mutual evaluations”
of national AML regimes. The aim was to get collective bodies to put
pressure on member countries to drive standards up. Though there
were many successes in generating change, the leading nations in the
FATF became impatient with consensus and in 2000 launched a “name
and shame” initiative with the publication of twenty-ﬁve criteria, based
on the Forty Recommendations, for identifying countries falling short
in their AML regimes (FATF 2000). While most jurisdictions on the
list were small, it included some major nations such as Egypt, Indo-
nesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Russia. Most of the twenty-three
named countries moved quickly to come into compliance, and as of
November 2005, only two countries—Myanmar and Nigeria—re-
mained on the list. The changes almost exclusively addressed preven-
tion, for example, imposing CDD requirements and creating an FIU
for receiving reports rather than enforcement.
Dissatisfaction with giving supervisory powers to a self-selected in-
28 As of November 2005, the FATF comprised thirty-one member jurisdictions (from
six continents) and two regional organizations (the European Commission and the Gulf
Co-operation Council). The People’s Republic of China was granted observer status, but
neither it nor India is currently a member; of current FATF members, only one (South
Africa) is from Africa.
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ternational body led to a change in 2002. The IMF and World Bank
agreed to conduct assessments of national AML systems as part of
broader ﬁnancial system reviews that they routinely conduct.
The attempt to institutionalize AML into the routine activities of
international bodies came at a price, however. Participation in an IMF/
World Bank review is entirely voluntary, and the country being re-
viewed itself decides whether the resulting report is published, a pro-
cedure that has the potential to negate the “name and shame”
mechanism used to press countries with shortfalls.29 The IMF and
World Bank have no powers to sanction and limited scope to promote
compliance through their lending and technical assistance programs.
2. The European Union. Pressures for AML consistency are partic-
ularly strong in the European Union. In 1991, the European Com-
munity adopted its ﬁrst directive on money laundering that sought to
establish minimum standards throughout what is now known as the
European Union. Stessens (2000) maintains that the action was moti-
vated in part by other global attempts to address money laundering
and also by concerns that money launderers or criminals would take
advantage of the increasingly free ﬂow of capital and ﬁnancial services
throughout the European Union. The need to establish a level playing
ﬁeld in Europe also was a concern. Nations with tougher AML regimes
might lose ﬁnancial business to those with lax rules. Gilmore (2004)
stresses the particular challenge that human rights concerns have posed
to establishing an AML regime in Europe, given that both fascism and
communism generated concerns about over-mighty central powers and
the abuse of intelligence. The Third Money Laundering Directive—
which came into force December 2005—builds on and replaces existing
E.U. legislation and incorporates into E.U. law the June 2003 revision
of the Forty Recommendations of the FATF (including the terrorist
ﬁnance provisions). Member states have until December 2007 to in-
corporate this into their national legislation, which will then be eval-
uated for compliance.
The directive is applicable to the ﬁnancial sector and to lawyers,
29 On the other hand, the full reports are normally published, rather than the summaries
previously made available. Moreover, nonpublication or even noticeable delay of a report
might be taken by the international community that there was something seriously wrong
with the jurisdiction’s AML system, and this might produce collateral ﬁnancial and re-
putational damage. For further details on these reports and other issues, see the FATF
Web site (http://www.fatf-gaﬁ.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00
.html).
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notaries, accountants, real estate agents, casinos, and trust and com-
pany service providers. Its scope also encompasses all providers of
goods, when payments are made in cash in excess of i15,000. The
directive introduces additional requirements and safeguards for situa-
tions of higher risk (e.g., trading with correspondent banks30 situated
outside the European Union). From 2005, E.U. member states will
also be required to set up controls of cash over i10,000 entering and
leaving the European Union and to share ﬁnancial intelligence about
this, implementing FATF recommendations.
C. Geopolitical Context of Money-Laundering Regulation
The international “community” now takes it for granted that the
objective of preventing drug trafﬁcking, fraud, and terrorism entitles
it to intervene in the laws and practices and criminal justice activities
of other states, particularly the less powerful ones. That was not the
case when the movement began twenty years ago. A good reason for
focusing on the early development of these issues is to tease out how
and why all of this international regulatory apparatus of late moder-
nity31 came to be regarded as self-evident. As an illustration, the annual
U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Re-
port on Money Laundering and Financial Crimes (State Department
2005, p. 4) reports on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of AML
efforts in all countries. It notes a rather lengthy list of ﬁfty-ﬁve prob-
lematic jurisdictions, including some with small and weak ﬁnancial sys-
tems (where predicate crimes might occur) and others that serve as
ﬁnancial centers, including the United Kingdom and the United States.
AML policy was developed by governments strongly committed to
freeing commerce—not just in the United Kingdom and United States,
but around the globe—from what they regarded as the oppressive hand
30 Correspondent banks are banks that do not have a local branch or even may not be
authorized to operate in the jurisdiction, but that (for a fee) are able to get local banks
to clear their transactions for them. Stimulated by the Bank of New York revelations,
this is now identiﬁed as a high-risk area since those who take on correspondent banking
must satisfy themselves that the other bank is itself conducting satisfactory CDD. Fol-
lowing that case and the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, most Western banks
rigorously reviewed the banks they took on as correspondents, since they thereby took
on liability for their counterpart’s due diligence standards.
31 Late modernity is a term used to describe a globalized economic and cultural system
in which change is routinized and cultural identity is no longer ﬁxed.Whereas the nation-
state was the primary unit of control in classical law, activities that transcend nation-
states may call forth different modes of regulation. For an attempt to apply this construct
to money laundering, see Sheptycki (2000).
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of the state. Compelling the banks to act as the unpaid vanguard of
crime prevention represented a challenge to that deregulatory culture,
and compelling banks outside direct governmental control to do so
other than for prudential reasons required a major ideological shift. Such
regulation was not in the ﬁrst instance an attempt to create an inter-
national level playing ﬁeld. Initially, in the United Kingdom and the
United States, though foreign banks operating in their jurisdictions
were included, AML and allied legislation related to proceeds of crime
conﬁscation were aimed at the domestic market and at domestic crime
problems. The notion of international governance over organized
crime facilitation developed in the lead up to the 1988 U.N. Vienna
Convention and the creation of FATF in 1989; the notion that there
was a right—and a mechanism—to impose a global level playing ﬁeld
of minimum standards did not emerge fully formed until the end of
the 1990s.
Prior to the creation of the FATF, there was a chasm in the global
governance of crime. Despite the growing role of U.S. law enforce-
ment extraterritorially (Nadelmann 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann
2006), there were no international institutions that played or had any
mandate to play a strong role in that regard.32 As the role of the FATF
became stronger and the social pressure to become good global citizens
through active AML efforts became greater, British ofﬁcials pushed for
greater regulatory efforts by those offshore centers that fell within Brit-
ain’s sphere of inﬂuence, preferably without destroying their economic
base entirely. British politicians and ofﬁcials became increasingly em-
barrassed at allegations in international fora such as FATF, the United
Nations, and the European Union that Britain was allowing its offshore
territories to behave like pirates. These allegations were undermining
what otherwise was an active leadership of global antilaundering reg-
ulation. Thus it was not surprising that the incoming Labour Govern-
ment was inclined to act. Home Secretary Jack Straw in late 1997 asked
a former Treasury civil servant to “review with the Island authorities
in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man their laws, systems and prac-
tices for regulation of their international ﬁnance centres, the combat-
ing of ﬁnancial crime and co-operation with other Jurisdictions”
32 The key international bodies such as the IMF and World Bank had (and generally
still have) no particular interest in crime or even, until the latter part of the 1990s, in
governance and anticorruption activities. Crime was not considered to be “macroeco-
nomically relevant” (ofﬁcials’ interviews with ML, August 2001).
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(http: // www.archive.ofﬁcial-documents.co.uk/ document/cm41/4109;
foreword.htm). Although tax policy was explicitly excluded from the
terms of reference (Edwards Report 1998, annex A), far from being a
conspiracy to whitewash the islands, the report represented a robust
attempt to get the “near islands” in line on those issues that did not
bear on differential tax rates.
The inquiry took ﬁfteen months and was politically contentious.
Nonetheless, the reforms ended up as something of a political success
for the islands, which were pressured not just to change legislation but
also to put in place institutional structures and (some increased) re-
sources to give effect to those laws and regulations. They gained a
reputational advantage at a time when action was being threatened
against the “noncooperative.”
Consequently, consultants KPMG were appointed to conduct a re-
view of the overseas territories (the British Caribbean) plus Bermuda.
This review produced a somewhat blander set of recommendations in
its published form (KPMG 2000) that brought the islands closer to
international legal and institutional standards, reﬂecting the changed
nature of expectations within a changed climate of norm enforcement.
However, it has been very difﬁcult not just to reduce the opacity of
ﬁnancial services regimes but also to deﬁne and apply sanctions to
ensure functional equivalence33 in how those regimes operate.
It may be surprising to some that economically and politically pow-
erful groups such as bankers and accountants have been compelled to
act as unpaid deputy sheriffs around the world. That this has happened
owes much to the primacy of law and order politics, especially in the
aftermath of prominent events related to organized crime, grand cor-
ruption, and terrorism. Although there was substantial pressure prior
to 9/11, for example, it is less likely that without the attacks, CDD or
measures against the ﬁnancing of terror would have commanded such
widespread acceptance, even in the United States, or that the IMF
would have taken on responsibility for AML monitoring. These
changes (and fears about nontransparent offshore liabilities of large
investment funds) have involved international institutions and jurisdic-
tions in some very difﬁcult and expensive transformations to enhance
33 Functional equivalence is anOECD concept applied to compliance, inwhichdifferent
methods of reaching the same objective are permitted. Avoiding the language of impe-
rialism is very important in international meetings: hence the use of terms such as this
and “approximation” rather than “harmonization” of criminal law within the European
Union.
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the surveillability of ﬁnancial movements. However, it is easier to track
their impact on the formal ﬁnancial system than on crimes and their
organization. It is to this underlying behavior that the regimes are
intended to control that we now turn.
II. Laundering Methods and Volume
We turn now to the targeted activities. We illustrate the diversity of
methods used and of the participants involved, which presumably have
some interactive relationship with the controls just discussed. We then
offer a classiﬁcation of the offenses that generate laundering and why
it is useful to distinguish among them, and conclude by showing that
the existing estimates of the volume of money laundered have little
credibility.
Money laundering begins with the fruits of a crime—the underlying
or “predicate” offense—and ends with funds that can be used safely or
at least with minimal risk, for any purpose. Money laundering is usually
described as having three sequential elements—placement, layering,
and integration. Placement is the introduction of the funds into the
ﬁnancial system, whether through cash deposits or more complex
methods. Layering is a set of activities intended to distance the funds
from their point of criminal origin. Integration involves converting
“illegal proceeds into apparently legitimate business earnings through
normal ﬁnancial or commercial operations” (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 2002, p. 7). In a sense, launderers need to
be only as devious as the system of controls requires them to be. Fi-
nancial secrecy havens as they existed before the 1990s (Blum et al.
1998) required far less skill of large-scale launderers than is the case
today, at least for those offenses that are exposed and investigated ﬁ-
nancially. It would be quite difﬁcult today to ﬁnd a Caribbean banker
willing to accept a known or unknown client ﬂying in by private plane
carrying suitcases containing millions of dollars in cash for deposit.
Not all money-laundering transactions involve all three distinct
phases, and some may indeed involve more (van Duyne 2003; van
Duyne and Levi 2005). Nonetheless, the three-stage classiﬁcation is a
useful decomposition of what can sometimes be a complex process.
Investigative attention goes mostly to the placement stage, the point
of highest vulnerability.
The paradigm applies awkwardly to terrorist ﬁnance. Stage 1 (place-
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ment) may not involve any crime at all; it is the ultimate use that is
the crime to be prevented. Moreover, integration is turned on its head.
The ﬁnal stage is the ﬁnancing of the terrorist act rather than the
return of the proceeds to the original owner. Whether the same system
is proper for both purposes, control of crime and reduction in terror-
ism, is a fair question. Figure 2 illustrates the ﬂows in the two kinds
of cases.
A. Methods
In contrast to most other types of crime, money laundering is no-
table for the diversity of its forms, participants, and settings. It can
involve the most respectable of banks unwittingly providing services to
customers with apparently impeccable credentials. The banks through
which Andrew Fastow (the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer of Enron) passed his
embezzled moneys from Enron or Robert Maxwell (the U.K. press
baron of the 1980s) passed his embezzled funds from the pension funds
of British newspaper employees had no basis for suspecting that these
were the fruits of crime. No charges have been ﬁled against the banks,34
though many have settled civil suits, and Fastow was charged with
laundering. But money laundering can also involve small nonﬁnancial
businesses knowingly providing similar services to violent criminals, as
in the case of truckers smuggling out large bundles of currency for
drug trafﬁckers.
Money laundering does not require international transactions; there
are many instances of purely domestic laundering.35 Nonetheless, a
large number of cases do involve the movement of funds across na-
tional borders. Though governments have unique police powers at the
border, those same borders—once crossed—can impede the ﬂow of
information.
Money can be laundered in many ways. There is a large and ever-
34 Under controversial post-9/11 fast-track extradition procedures with the United
States, which have been applied mainly to white-collar defendants, three U.K. NatWest
bankers were ordered (in May 2005, subject to appeal as we write) to be extradited to
the United States to face trial. The bank itself has not been charged and is portrayed as
the victim of fraud in the Enron case, though it did not press charges against its former
employees for their alleged conspiracy with Enron.
35 For example, in the United States v. Clyde Hood et al., Central District of Illinois,
an indictment returned on August 18, 2000, charged the defendant with fraud for col-
lecting checks totaling at least $12,500,000 from investors who were promised a 5,000
percent return. Funds were deposited in checking accounts and used to incorporate and
support participants’ businesses, as well as to purchase real estate, all within the Mattoon,
IL, area.
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World Bank [2003a]).
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growing literature of a “how to” and “look how awesome and out of
control this problem is” nature (e.g., Robinson 1996, 2004; Woods
1998; Blunden 2001; Lilley 2002; Southwell 2002; Mathers 2004; Ko-
chan 2005). The Internet has added to the available set of methods,
though most of the e-schemes are arguably more theoretical than real
or are very difﬁcult mechanisms through which to launder large sums
over a long period. Some of the major mechanisms described below
are associated with only one of the three phases of money laundering,
whereas others are usable in any phase.
The methods for laundering can be as simple as carrying money in
suitcases across borders to jurisdictions that are less diligent in enforce-
ment of global AML rules. The purchase of easily transportable high-
value goods, such as rare stamps or diamonds, facilitates this. Insurance
and real estate transactions can be used to conceal the origins of funds.
More sophisticated schemes involve complex bank transfers and the
purchase of businesses that can overstate their takings. Reuter and Tru-
man (2004, pp. 27–32) provide a compact listing and description; fur-
ther details may be found in the U.S. Money Laundering Threat As-
sessment (U.S. Department of Justice 2006).
B. The Distribution of Methods across Countries and Crimes
A reasonable conjecture is that different methods are used for laun-
dering the proceeds from different predicate crimes. Using a database
of cases summarized in the annual Typologies reports from the FATF
and Egmont Group (annual, to 2003), Reuter and Truman (2004, chap.
3) found that three offense categories accounted for over 70 percent
of entries: drugs (185), fraud (125), and other kinds of smuggling (92).
The types of laundering methods were more evenly distributed: wire
transfers were involved in 131 cases (22 percent), but no other single
method was involved in more than seventy-ﬁve cases. For the three
major offense categories, the numbers were broadly distributed across
methods.
While these ﬁndings offer some insights into the laundering meth-
ods used for different offenses, the results should not be overgeneral-
ized. Neither the FATF nor the Egmont Group makes any claim to
be offering a representative sample of cases in their “money-laundering
typology” exercises (which have improved since 2003). However, the
information does have some value. For example, the data show that
drug trafﬁckers and other smugglers use a wide variety of methods for
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TABLE 2
Ways of Disguising and Laundering
Crime Proceeds
Forms of Concealment/
Disguise Frequency
Export of currency 31
Disguise of ownership 10
False justiﬁcation:
Loan back 3
Payroll 2
Speculation 1
Bookkeeping 7
Untraceable 4
SOURCE.—Van Duyne and Levi (2005).
laundering the proceeds of their crimes. More weakly (and perhaps
reﬂecting investigative and forensic difﬁculties in those areas), the ty-
pologies prior to 2003 suggest by omission that some methods are not
much used, such as alternative remittance systems and trusts and se-
curities. This seems implausible. Rather than indicating underlying
trends in techniques, typologies reﬂect the shifting focus of ﬁnancial
intelligence within private and public sectors, generating a search for
examples of those behaviors on which they have decided to focus.
Van Duyne and Levi (2005) studied the methods used in cases that
survived the ﬁnal appeal stage in the Netherlands over the period
1990–2000. Their ﬁndings are summarized in table 2.
Many of these cases brought to justice in Europe and elsewhere pose
problems for the AML system. There may be difﬁculty in ﬁnding any
substantial assets. This does not necessarily imply a failing in legal
powers or forensic skills; the target may simply not own (or may not
directly or indirectly control) many assets. The difﬁculty is remediable
only by proactive surveillance before arrest, something that could in
principle be dealt with under the current legal regime. There are also
policy difﬁculties over how competent counsel in large complex cases
are to be paid for, since for lawyers to accept tainted funds would
expose them to money-laundering charges.
Suendorf’s (2001) German language study of laundering in Germany
(discussed in van Duyne and Levi [2005]) contains forty examples of
money laundering in the broad juridical meaning of the word, that is,
every subsequent handling of illegal proﬁts aimed at disguising their
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origins. Two cases can be considered to fall into the category of thor-
oughly organized money management: the Bosporus case and the Mo-
zart case. Both cases concerned organizations established to move the
crime moneys of heroin wholesalers to their respective home countries.
The Bosporus case identiﬁed an extensive and complex network of
money exchange bureaus directed by an Iranian entrepreneur who
served a Kurdish heroin wholesaler. The funds were collected in var-
ious cities in Germany and carried to branches of the Iranian or as-
sociated independent bureaus. Subsequently the cash was placed in
German banks and transferred to bank accounts of allied money
change ofﬁces in New York. From these accounts the moneys were
diverted to Dubai and—if required—back to Germany or Turkey. To
allay the potential suspicions of the German police, the bureau de change
submitted occasional suspicious transaction reports.
The Mozart case (which involved $35 million in criminal funds) rep-
resents a similar network of money change ofﬁces working on behalf
of Turkish heroin wholesalers, which were fed with crime money from
Italy and Spain. The handling of the crime money appeared to be even
better integrated into the legitimate cross-border trade system of Tur-
key with Europe. Turkish traders, who were in need of E.U. currency,
could circumvent the exchange control restrictions by balancing their
payments in Germany (made through the exchange ofﬁce in Germany)
by the placement of Turkish money in Istanbul. These legitimate mon-
eys (disregarding the violation of exchange control) could be inter-
twined with the crime moneys.
In eleven of the forty cases, there was an attempt to make an in-
vestment in the upper world, though with variable success and degrees
of professionalism. Three examples illustrate this:
• Real estate: three instances of insolvent enterprises; one was a con-
struction ﬁrm, which obtained a suspicious Italian infusion of
money but nevertheless went bankrupt (208/210). No relationship
with drugs is mentioned.
• A greengrocer, whose son was involved in heroin trafﬁc and in-
vested part of the proceeds in his father’s ﬁrm, which expanded
quickly (207).
• A designer bathroom store, whose licit Russian owner was pres-
sured to accept a compatriot as a manager. Money laundering is
suspected (208/9). Likewise, no drug relationship is mentioned.
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In many cases, it remained unclear whether the moneys had been
really “cleansed” sufﬁciently to defeat courts. Most of the other ex-
amples concerned only the placement of suspected moneys rather than
its full integration. Overall, the sophistication and professionalism dis-
played were modest. The same was true in the extensive set of cases
discussed by van Duyne and Levi (2005), based on ﬁnalized cases.36
The Dutch wholesalers discussed in van Duyne and Levi (2005) did
not appear to use “ﬁnancial secrecy havens” for depositing drug money
to the extent expected. Most involved neighboring countries: Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany, or countries of the offenders’ origins (Mo-
rocco and Turkey). Other jurisdictions were very thinly represented.
Bank accounts were found in Panama, Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, Jersey,
the British Virgin Islands, and Dubai, but in only six out of seventeen
cases.
This European ﬁnding does not appear to ﬁt the image, conveyed
in both the popular money-laundering literature and the laundering
nonﬁction texts, of transnational criminals spreading their ill-gotten
proﬁts worldwide over ﬁnancial secrecy havens. Instead, it rather seems
that the choice of banking jurisdiction is strongly inﬂuenced by prox-
imity to the drug entrepreneur’s economic home.37 Even in the global
village, most offenders do not venture far from familiar territory.
Terrorist attacks in the twenty-ﬁrst century have renewed focus on
remittances, charities, and other means of both tactical and strategic
ﬁnancing of terror (Passas 2005). The FATF typologies reﬂect this,38
even though this may indicate not so much that they are “new trends”
as that improvements or shifts in the intelligence collections process
have uncovered more about those methods than was previously known.
36 This sample may exclude the most complex cases that were not sufﬁciently clear-
cut to satisfy the courts on a criminal burden of proof and either were not prosecuted
or, if prosecuted, did not result in a conviction. These cases might have disproportionately
involved ﬁnancial secrecy havens that frustrated customs and police investigations, but
the absence of evidence does not prove that criminals did use these havens!
37 Another factor may be the obstacles that police expected to encounter in trying to
track accounts in ﬁnancial secrecy havens themselves; as a result, they may not have
attempted to locate funds there. That would turn this outcome into an artifact of the
actual or perceived investigative possibilities. All we can determine is that ﬁnancial secrecy
havens are important, though the frequency of their use was not reﬂected in the routine
practices of the afﬂuent British or Dutch drug entrepreneurs.
38 The 2002 Typologies Report was devoted entirely to terrorist ﬁnance.
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C. Who Provides the Laundering Services?
Our understanding of who provides laundering services reﬂects the
intelligence collections process; there is little systematic attention given
to aggregate patterns. Much ﬁnancial investigation is satisﬁed by “low-
hanging fruit,” especially outside the United States, where resources
are limited. If difﬁcult cases are not pursued, then there are no data to
analyze. Thus the following observations about available cases are
merely indicative.
It is easiest to launder money with the help of someone inside a
ﬁnancial institution. Bank employees can be coerced or bribed not to
ﬁle SARs or CTRs. Alternatively, the forms may be ﬁlled out, with the
government’s copy conveniently ﬁled in the trash and the other copy
remaining in a drawer in case of an investigation.39
Although there may be members of organized crime groups who
specialize in money laundering, some professional money-laundering
agents are not otherwise involved in criminal activities. Some may not
even be aware that they are laundering: in several cases of “negligent
money laundering” that resulted in conviction and imprisonment, it
was determined that the agent should have suspected that the funds
were derived from criminal activities yet demonstrated “willful blind-
ness” in failing to make that observation. This is potentially a major
issue. If the business did a risk assessment but nevertheless was used
for money laundering without its knowledge, to what extent should it
be held liable?
Lawyers are thought to be among the most common laundering
agents or at least facilitators, though they have been at the center of
relatively few cases in the United States; Robinson (1996, chap. 8)
provides some interesting descriptions. A lawyer can use his or her
own name to acquire bank accounts, credit cards, loan agreements, or
other money-laundering tools on behalf of the client. Lawyers can also
establish shell corporations, trusts, or partnerships and receive cash
deposits and run transactions through their client accounts or even
(more riskily) their ofﬁce accounts. In the event of an investigation,
lawyer-client conﬁdentiality privileges can be invoked or attempted,
depending on the rules of the jurisdiction. In one case cited by the
FATF in its 1997–98 typology report, a lawyer charged a ﬂat fee to
39 Electronic ﬁling, which would eliminate this option, is not currently required in the
United States, though it has been standard for years in Australia and is the norm in the
United Kingdom, at least for repeat players.
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launder money by setting up annuity packages for his clients to hide
the laundering. He also arranged for credit cards in false names to be
issued to his clients, who could use the cards to make ATM cash with-
drawals. The card issuer knew only the identity of the lawyer and had
no knowledge of the clients’ identities.40
Other professionals involved in money laundering include account-
ants, notaries, ﬁnancial advisers, stockbrokers, insurance agents, and
real estate agents. A British report noted that in 2002, “purchasing
property in the UK was the most popular method identiﬁed, involving
roughly one in three serious and organized crime groups where the
method was known” (National Criminal Intelligence Service 2003,
chap. 6; however, it is not stated in what proportion of cases it is
known). However, as partner, bank, and regulator vigilance over law-
yers’ client accounts has increased in the United Kingdom—each law
ﬁrm is required to appoint a money laundering reporting ofﬁcer who
is professionally and criminally responsible for the ﬁrm’s compliance—
it has become harder to wash large amounts of cash in this way. Fur-
thermore, in theory, the purchase of a property does not eliminate the
need for explanation of the origins of wealth should such an accounting
be required. Hence the importance of the burden of proof, since it is
not an offense to have unaccounted wealth.41 The dependence on con-
viction at a criminal standard of proof has in turn precipitated the
development of civil forfeiture or recovery proceedings in Australia,
the Irish Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for
example; civil or criminal charges of tax fraud can also be laid.
The most general point is the variety of professions involved. In
Europe, among those regulated by money-laundering directives, auto
dealers may be used to purchase expensive automobiles for cash, which
can then be resold (at signiﬁcant depreciation); real estate agents may
be involved in sale of commercial or private residences, sometimes
facilitating under-the-counter cash payments to supplement the re-
corded price, perhaps “only” to evade property taxes; criminals may
purchase holdings in companies or businesses through accountant or
40 It is doubtful that this would occur today.
41 There is an exception in those (ex–British colony) jurisdictions in which public ser-
vants can be prosecuted for living in a manner inconsistent with their known income or
wealth. This legislation originated in places such as Hong Kong and Singapore, where
the British colonial administration wanted to ﬁnd easy ways of ﬁring and prosecuting
police and civil servants for corruption without having to provide direct evidence of
corrupt exchange.
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lawyer nominees, or directly; accountants may overstate business tak-
ings, understate costs, or otherwise assist the transfer of value by false
pricing (or be complicit in such falsiﬁcations by criminal businesspeo-
ple); art, antiques, and jewelry may be purchased for cash or for other
ﬁnancial instruments.
D. Markets for Laundering Services
Since money laundering is a criminal service offered in return for
payment, it is worth considering the “market” for such services. For
example, making laundering services more expensive should reduce
their volume. It should also lower the volume of predicate crime since
the return from crime is reduced. Price might also serve as a perfor-
mance indicator as to how well the control system works. Unfortu-
nately, law enforcement agencies do not systematically record price
information acquired in the process of developing money-laundering
cases, since that information is not necessary to obtain a conviction.42
Moreover, price is an ambiguous concept in this context. Apart from
the fact that some laundering agents provide only partial services (e.g.,
just placement or layering), there are at least two possible interpreta-
tions of price: the fraction of the funds received by the launderer, in-
cluding what he or she paid to other service providers, and the share
of the original total amount that does not return to the owner’s control.
The latter share could include tax payments, as in the case of a retail
proprietor who might charge only 5 percent for allowing the commin-
gling of illegal funds with his or her store’s receipts, but then might
have to add another 5 percent for the sales tax that would be generated
by these fraudulent receipts.
The policy-relevant price is the second of these, the difference be-
tween the amount laundered and the amount eventually received by
the offender. Pushing offenders to use laundering methods that involve
smaller payments to launderers but higher total costs (because of taxes)
to the predicate offender is indeed preferable to raising the revenues
received by launderers as a group; after all, the difference includes
payments to the public sector. Such substitution might occur if the
government mounted more sting operations aimed at customers.
The difference is by no means only of theoretical interest. Take, for
example, one case cited by the Egmont Group (2000) of high-priced
42 The 2002 U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy noted the importance of col-
lecting such data.
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Money Laundering 321
laundering in which most of the price did not accrue to the launderer.
A credit manager at a car loan company was suspicious about one of
his customers. “Ray” had just bought a luxury sports car worth about
$55,000, ﬁnancing the car through the credit company for $40,000 and
paying the balance in cash. Records showed that Ray had taken out
several loans over the past few years, all for the same amount of money
and with a large portion as a cash deposit. In many cases the loans had
been repaid early with cash. The national FIU realized that Ray was
laundering for a long-established criminal organization, putting cash
from the sale of drugs into the banking system. He would resell the
newly bought cars, obtaining checks to deposit into a single bank ac-
count, in all totaling over $300,000. The losses made on the loan and
the drop in the automobiles’ resale values were the cost of obtaining
“clean” money.
Information about the price of money-laundering services is scat-
tered and anecdotal. In the money-laundering activity targeted by Op-
eration Polar Cap, a coordinated law enforcement operation (or
“sting”) during the late 1980s, the drug trafﬁcker would pay only 4.5
percent to the government sting launderer initially, but was willing to
go to 5 percent if the laundering were done rapidly (Woolner 1994, p.
43). Later in the operation there were reports of much higher margins.
Experienced investigators refer to a general price range of 7–15 percent
for laundering for drug dealers, but some reports are inconsistent with
such estimates. One National Money Laundering Strategy (U.S. Trea-
sury 2002, p. 12) reported a study that found commission rates varying
between 4 and 8 percent but rising as high as 12 percent.
Other criminals pay much less for money-laundering services. For
example, John Mathewson, who operated a Cayman Islands bank that
laundered money for a number of white-collar offenders (e.g., Medi-
care fraudsters, recording pirates) and U.S. tax evaders, charged a ﬂat
fee of $5,000 for an account, plus a $3,000 per year management fee
(Fields and Whitﬁeld 2001). Mathewson, who provided a complete set
of services, also kept 1 percent of the ﬂoat that the clients’ money
earned when held overnight by other banks (U.S. Senate 2001).
Whether Mathewson charged more for drug dealers or refused their
business cannot be established from the published materials.
The price paid for a particular money-laundering service apparently
is partly a function of the predicate crime and the volume of funds that
needs to be laundered. Whereas legitimate, larger ﬁnancial transactions
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generate lower per unit costs, the opposite is true for money launder-
ing: the risk of detection is a major cost (perhaps the principal cost),
and that risk will rise with the quantity being laundered. By contrast,
however, a broker involved in Colombian black-market peso operations
claimed that he charged less for larger volumes of money. Prices may
be affected not just by enforcement risks attached to different predicate
crimes—just as someone on the run for a particular crime involving
heat may have to pay more for counterfeit documents and to be hid-
den—but even perhaps by moral qualms on the part of potential laun-
derers. One might expect terrorist ﬁnance to be expensive by this cri-
terion, though some ideologically sympathetic bankers and business
people might assist freedom ﬁghters from their community for free,
whereas they would not assist drug trafﬁckers at all or would charge
them more. They might also be pressured to assist, as in Colombia
and Ireland as well as in some ethnic diasporas. Despite use of illegal
drugs by ﬁnancial services personnel, there are very few cases in which
dealers are known to have blackmailed staff, whether prosecuted or
mentioned informally in research: if there is not a “dark ﬁgure” of
undetected blackmail, the reason may be that dealers do not wish to
frighten off good clients or that the information does not percolate far
enough upward to those who require laundering services. American
and European banking compliance personnel regularly express concern
about inﬁltration by organized criminals and—since 9/11—terrorist
sympathizers, and seek to monitor staff for signs of such facilitation as
well as for fraud against banks and customers.43
A large number of money-laundering cases appear to involve op-
portunistic laundering rather than professional services. Where some-
one apart from the offender provides the service, he may provide it
only to that offender, perhaps because they are related or connected
through some other activity. Drug dealers appear to be more likely to
purchase formal money-laundering services, perhaps because the reg-
ular ﬂow of currency makes their needs more acute and less easily met.
E. Classiﬁcation of Predicate Offenses
For both research and policy it is important to recognize the het-
erogeneity of money laundering from different criminal activities. Reu-
43 Interviews with Michael Levi, 1990–2005. Periodic background checks (subject to
data protection restrictions) and checks on computer accessing of customer information
are methods used.
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of Taxonomy of Money-Laundering Predicate Crimes
Cash
Scale of
Operations
Severity of
Harms
Most Affected
Populations
Drug dealing Exclusively Very large High Minority urban groups
Other illegal market Mostly Small to medium Low to modest ?
White-collar Mix Mix Low to modest Broad
Bribery and corruption No Large Severe Developing countries
Terrorism Mix Small Very severe Broad
SOURCE.—Reuter and Truman (2004).
ter and Truman (2004) suggest a preliminary ﬁve-part classiﬁcation of
offenses to help understand the effects of speciﬁc money-laundering
controls: drug distribution, other blue-collar crime, white-collar crime,
bribery and corruption, and terrorism. These categories create more
homogeneity with respect to the effects of interventions and the seri-
ousness and distribution of the harm caused by particular offenses to
society. The categories also differ from each other in these same di-
mensions. It can be conjectured, for example, that the response to in-
creased scrutiny of, say, casinos on the part of white-collar offenders,
whose crimes often generate electronic fund transfers or checks rather
than cash, will differ from those who launder money on behalf of drug
dealers. Similarly, the beneﬁts from reducing at least some white-collar
crimes by $1 billion might be valued substantially less than those as-
sociated with a similar reduction in crack cocaine or methamphetamine
trafﬁcking. The distribution of beneﬁts from reducing either of the
two offenses may also be quite different: those who are harmed by
drug trafﬁcking are disproportionately from poor and minority urban
populations, whereas the costs of white-collar crimes are borne far
more broadly across society, depending on what sorts of frauds they
are and in which countries (Levi and Pithouse, forthcoming).
Table 3 provides hypotheses about the differences in the relevant
dimensions among the ﬁve groups. The entries concerning the “se-
verity of harm” and the “most affected populations” are judgments
offered by Reuter and Truman (2004) not as authoritative but simply
to identify dimensions that deserve consideration in policy making.
1. Drug Distribution. Major drug trafﬁckers face a unique problem:
how to manage large sums of cash regularly and frequently, much of
it in small bills. For example, in Operation Polar Cap in the mid-1980s,
U.S. agents acting as distributors associated with the Medellı´n cartel
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handled some $1.5 million a week in currency. Few legitimate or crim-
inal establishments operate with such large and steady cash ﬂows.
This distinctive characteristic of drug distribution is particularly im-
portant because the current AML regime initially was constructed pri-
marily to control drug trafﬁcking, an aspect of the regime that contin-
ues to affect public perceptions of the nature of the money-laundering
problem.
2. Other Illegal Market Crimes. Other potential large-scale illegal
markets that would seem at ﬁrst glance as likely candidates for gen-
erating a demand for money laundering include gambling and the
smuggling of people (both voluntarily as economic migration and in-
voluntarily—by force or fraud—as “people trafﬁcking”). However
these markets generate relatively modest demand simply because they
have substantially lower revenues than drug markets. That is not a
historical constant but an observation about the past two decades in
industrial societies, and is independent of the relative seriousness of
the behavior, people trafﬁcking being very harmful.
The amounts of money for any individual operation in these other
areas appear to be much smaller than for drug distribution, in part
because total and unit revenues are smaller and in part because what
has to be laundered is net rather than gross revenues. For example, a
bookmaker will receive from customers and agents only what they owe
at the end of the accounting period (perhaps one or two weeks). A
gambler who wagers $10,000 per week on football, where the margin
for the bookmaker is less than 3 percent, might make only monthly
transfers of $1,000 (see Reuter 1983, chap. 2). In the part of the sex
trade that employs trafﬁcked women (as contrasted with locals and
voluntary economic migrants), margins would be expected to be much
higher; some of the trade may involve credit cards and legitimate front
companies, not least so that clients’ expenditures can be passed off
without embarrassment.
3. White-Collar Crimes. The white-collar crime category covers a
heterogeneous range of offenses, including embezzlement, fraud, and
tax evasion, some of them confusingly committed by organized crime
members involved in racketeering offenses. A distinctive feature of
these crimes is that the money laundering is often an integral part of
the offense itself. The Enron case demonstrates a complex scheme in
which hundreds of shell corporations in the Cayman Islands served not
only as questionable tax shelters but also as laundering mechanisms to
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obscure a trail of fraudulent behavior. Money-laundering services in
such cases often are provided by the offenders themselves, since the
offense itself requires skills similar to those involved in money laun-
dering. Indeed, where there are false invoices and other accounting
frauds (such as value-added tax frauds in the European Union), such
activities often constitute both the predicate and the laundering of-
fense. However, if the underlying transactions are exposed as fraudu-
lent (which is far from automatic), the money may not turn out to have
been laundered effectively unless some further steps have taken place
to break the money trail and frustrate pursuit. In this sense, as van
Duyne and Levi (2005) argue, the funds might be better described as
“hidden” rather than “laundered,” even though laundering charges may
be brought.
4. Bribery and Corruption. While bribery and corruption can be
classiﬁed as white-collar crime, they are distinctive in terms of who
beneﬁts (public ofﬁcials and those who beneﬁt from their decisions),
where they occur (primarily though far from exclusively in poor coun-
tries44), and the nature of their harm (reduced government credibility
and public services). The laundering is almost inherently international:
those corrupted prefer to keep the proceeds out of local banks unless
the banks themselves were complicit or (as in the majority of corrupt
acts in poor countries) the amounts were small. Money laundering also
is often embedded in the offense itself when the corruption is large-
scale. For example, San Diego defense contractor Titan Corporation
pleaded guilty to three counts of foreign bribery involving the presi-
dent of Benin. Among other payments, the company funneled nearly
US$1 million to the offshore accounts of the president’s reelection
campaign. Procurement contracts in construction and defense are par-
ticularly prone to such transnational kickbacks.
F. Terrorism
The distinctive feature of terrorism is that it takes money both le-
gitimately and criminally generated and converts it into criminal use.
The sums of money involved are said to be modest: tens or hundreds
of thousands of dollars rather than millions; see the report of the 9/11
44 Indeed, France, Japan, and Korea, far from being poor nations, have experienced
continuing corruption scandals involving the very highest level of government; in the
case of Korea, at least one former president has been imprisoned for large-scale bribe
taking. Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy has been prosecuted for corruption and tax
offenses.
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
326 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter
Commission on the ﬁnancing of the Twin Towers bombing (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, p. 172).
Yet the harm is unique and enormous.
Assessments of the relevant differences between the ﬁve types of
offenses are just judgments. There will be near consensus that terror-
ism poses a greater threat to social welfare than any of the other of-
fenses. Many, partly inﬂuenced by media coverage, may consider the
harm associated with white-collar and blue-collar crimes other than
drugs to be relatively modest, although speciﬁc offenses may be ranked
high in social harm.45 Yet another offense, major environmental crimes,
could well strike some observers as just as harmful as selling cocaine.
The assessment of distributional consequences is intended as a re-
minder that beneﬁts of interventions are far from uniform, since these
offenses affect different parts of society. Indeed, there even are signif-
icant differences across nations; kleptocracy is surely more important
than any of the other offenses for sub-Saharan Africa and for many
parts of South America, but this is not the case in rich nations such as
the Netherlands.
Whether this is a useful disaggregation depends in part on the hy-
pothesis presented here that speciﬁc interventions will vary in their
effects on the money laundering associated with these offenses. For
example, elimination of large bills might substantially complicate
money laundering for drug smugglers who make extensive use of bulk
cash smuggling46 but have minimal effect on terrorist ﬁnance, which
(except when funded by drug trafﬁcking) does not use this technique.
In making policy, it may be important to identify which kinds of harm
are most likely to be reduced by the chosen interventions.
G. How Much Money Is Laundered?
Given the variety of offenses and the diversity of adverse conse-
quences per dollar, estimates of the total volume of money laundered
would seem to have limited value. A reduction in the total amount of
money laundering that represented a decline in gambling or corporate
fraud but hid a smaller increase in terrorist ﬁnance would hardly be
45 White-collar and blue-collar crimes are sufﬁciently heterogeneous that consensus is
not likely, and crime seriousness surveys internationally indicate strong public condem-
nation of a variety of white-collar crimes (Levi and Jones 1985; Levi and Pithouse,
forthcoming).
46 This was a matter of some controversy when the euro was introduced, with the i500
note being the maximum size.
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indicative of progress, given the much greater social harm caused by
terrorism.
Nonetheless, there is a continuing demand for an estimate of how
much money is laundered both in the United States and globally.
Numbers are frequently cited, with minimal documentation, becoming
“facts by repetition.” For example, the IMF estimated a total of $590
billion to $1.5 trillion globally in 1996. In 2005 the United Nations
cited the range of $500 billion to $1 trillion (http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/money_laundering.html, accessed June 2, 2005). A sustained
effort between 1996 and 2000 by the FATF to produce a fully docu-
mented estimate failed.47
There are, however, a few estimates of the potential demand for
money laundering that are regularly treated as actual money-launder-
ing estimates. The estimates fall into two categories: macroeconomic
and microeconomic. Neither method yields estimates that can be con-
sidered as anything more than indicative. The macroeconomic esti-
mates are methodologically ﬂawed: they generate implausibly high ﬁg-
ures. The microeconomic estimates lack a credible empirical base.
These ﬁgures conﬁrm that the phenomenon of money laundering is
of sufﬁcient scale to warrant public policy attention, but they are too
imprecise to provide guidance for policy.
1. Macroeconomic Estimates. The macroeconomic approach is based
on a broad deﬁnition that assumes that any revenue on which no tax
is paid—be it from a legal or illegal activity—will need to be laundered
in some way. In this view, the volume of the demand for money laun-
dering is related to the monetary component of the so-called under-
ground economy.
The study of what has been called the underground, shadow, hidden,
or black economy ﬁrst emerged in the late 1970s in response to the
observation that, despite the growth of credit cards and other methods
of purchase substituting for currency, the ratio of currency to gross
domestic product (GDP) had not declined (Gutmann 1977; Feige
1979). More recently, one particular estimation method, the currency-
demand approach, has been applied frequently enough to allow for
comparison of many different countries over one or two decades.
Schneider and Enste (2000) summarize this research. They present
a “reasonable consensus deﬁnition” of the underground economy based
47 One of the authors of this study (Peter Reuter) was involved in the latter stages of
this effort, which did not result in any ofﬁcial publication.
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on an earlier schematization by Mirus and Smith (1997). They provide
roughly comparable estimates for many countries based on the cur-
rency-demand approach and generate extremely high estimates. The
cumulative underground economies of the twenty-one OECD coun-
tries since 1997 total over $3 trillion annually, and for single nations
the underground economy represented an average of 16–17 percent of
GDP. Since 1994 the ﬁgure exceeds 10 percent of global GDP for
most years.48 This is substantially above the 2–5 percent of global GDP
cited in 1998 by Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the
IMF, as a “consensus range” for the scale of money-laundering trans-
actions. Even this lower guesstimate was described by Camdessus in a
speech to the FATF (Paris, February 10, 1998) as “beyond imagina-
tion.” Walker (1999) attempted a heroic global estimation that pro-
duced some counterintuitive, if intriguing, estimates for different ju-
risdictions.
The absolute and percentage estimates are shocking if taken as mea-
sures of money laundering. However, they are frail even in their own
terms as measures of what evades government taxation and other re-
strictions, and still more frail as the basis for estimating potential laun-
dering volume. Blades and Roberts (2002) review various estimates.
Their main critique is that nonobserved activities are highly concen-
trated in certain sectors of the economy, such as retail trade, taxis,
trucking, and restaurants; whereas other sectors such as power gener-
ation, heavy industry, or air transport are intrinsically less vulnerable,
simply because the organizations have no incentive to underreport rev-
enues. If one were to take this into account, the high estimates would
imply that much larger shares of the susceptible sectors are completely
underground, which hardly seems credible. Blades and Roberts (2002)
offer a variety of other technical critiques as well.
2. Microeconomic Estimates. The microeconomic approach to esti-
mating demand for money laundering is in a sense a complement to
the macroeconomic approaches, which pay limited attention to esti-
mating total earnings from criminal activities, aside from tax evasion.
The microeconomic approach estimates the incomes from each type
of crime. These estimates normally do not include the informal econ-
omy or activities that, though legal, are not reported in order to evade
taxes. However, in principle it would be possible to graft those esti-
48 On the basis of world GDP in constant 1995 dollars. See World Bank (2003b).
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mates onto such measures. The problems associated with the micro-
economic approach basically involve the paucity and unreliability of
the data.
There have been two systematic efforts to provide estimates of in-
comes generated by a broad range of criminal activities in the United
States. Simon and Witte (1982) cobbled together ﬁgures for the late
1970s. Indicative of the uncertainty of their results, which they ac-
knowledge, is the basis for their estimate for income from prostitution.
They started with survey-based estimates of the total number of acts
of prostitution nationally and the number that a full-time prostitute
would commit in the course of a year. This calculation resulted in an
estimate of full-time-equivalent prostitutes of 80,000–500,000, disre-
garding part-time sex work aimed at supplementing low incomes. Add
in considerable uncertainty about the annual earnings of a prostitute,
and the result is an estimate that spans approximately an order of mag-
nitude.
Under the auspices of the President’s Commission on Organized
Crime, Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates, a U.S. research
ﬁrm, also developed estimates of incomes from many different criminal
activities. In its ﬁnal report in 1987, the commission stated that or-
ganized crime produced an annual net income of approximately $47
billion. Nine of the commission’s eighteen members expressed reser-
vations about this estimate.
Reuter and Truman (2004, chap. 2) used estimates of the proceeds
from thirty-four crimes in the United States covering one or more
years during the period 1965–2000 to estimate total criminal earnings.
The thirty sources used included both public agencies and private or-
ganizations. For most crimes, estimates were available for only a few
years. There were data for ten or fewer crimes for fourteen of the
years, for eleven to ﬁfteen crimes for nineteen of the years, and for up
to twenty-two crimes for the remaining four years. Sixteen crimes had
ten or fewer years of data, whereas only nine crimes had more than
twenty-ﬁve years’ worth. The results are presented in table 4. Simple
linear projections were imputed for all the missing years to generate
estimates for all crime for all years; some of the projections cover a
large number of years.
A glimpse at one of the more complete years in table 5 reveals the
general composition of the U.S. criminal economy according to these
estimates. In 1990, the most lucrative crime (in aggregate) was fraud
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TABLE 4
Estimated Earnings from Criminal Activity in the United States,
1965–2000, Billions of Current U.S. Dollars
Year
Tax Evasion Included Tax Evasion Excluded
Estimated
Criminal
Income
Percent
of GDP
Estimated
Criminal
Income
Percent
of GDP
1965 49 6.8 18 2.5
1970 74 7.1 26 2.5
1975 118 7.2 45 2.7
1980 196 7.0 78 2.8
1985 342 8.1 166 4.0
1990 471 8.1 209 3.6
1995 595 8.0 206 2.8
2000 (estimate) 779 7.9 224 2.3
SOURCE.—Reuter and Truman (2004).
NOTE.—Non–tax evasion crimes included trafﬁcking in illicit drugs, human trafﬁcking,
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, robbery, fraud arson, nonarson fraud, coun-
terfeiting, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and prostitution. Tax evasion crimes included
federal income, federal proﬁts, and excise tax evasion.
(including tax fraud), producing an estimated $500 billion. Drug traf-
ﬁcking resulted in approximately $70 billion in revenues, and between
$5 billion and $20 billion was garnered from illegal gambling. The
total for all crimes with available data amounted to roughly $700 bil-
lion, approximately 8 percent of U.S. GDP in 1998.49 A time series of
these data shows that criminal income in the United States rose from
just under 7 percent of GDP to around 8 percent, with the largest
increase occurring in the early 1980s. However, when tax evasion es-
timates were removed from the totals, the criminal share of U.S. GDP
ranged from 2.5 to 4 percent, peaking in the late 1980s before dropping
to the levels of the late 1960s.
The fraud estimate, by far the largest single item in most years, is
particularly frail. It comes from a report by the Association of Certiﬁed
Fraud Examiners (2002), which sent survey forms to 10,000 of its
members, fewer than 10 percent of whom responded. Respondents
provided speciﬁc information about cases of which they were aware.
49 If criminal activities accounted for the same share of GDP of other OECD countries,
the global total would be $2.4 trillion. There is no way to validate this assumption, but
it appears that the United States has a much larger drug market (in GDP terms) than
other nations. However, drugs account for less than 10 percent of the estimated $700
billion in revenues from crime in 1998.
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TABLE 5
United States, 1990
Crime
Proceeds in Billions
of Current Dollars
Percent
of Total
Tax evasion 262.2 55.7
Cocaine trafﬁcking 61.3 13.0
Fraud (nonarson) 59.3 12.6
Heroin trafﬁcking 17.6 3.7
Prostitution 14.7 3.1
Loan sharking 14.0 3.0
Marijuana trafﬁcking 13.5 2.9
Motor vehicle theft 8.0 1.7
Illegal gambling 7.6 1.6
Other drug trafﬁcking 4.8 1.0
Larceny/theft 3.8 .8
Burglary 3.5 .7
Robbery .5 .2
Human trafﬁcking .2 .04
Counterfeiting .1 .02
Fraud arson .04 .008
Total 471.1
SOURCE.—Reuter and Truman (2004); ONDCP (2000, 2001); Simon
and Witte (1982); GAO (2002); Federal Bureau of Investigation’s annual
Uniform Crime Reports; Internal Revenue Service; International Orga-
nization on Migration; Abt, Smith, and Christiansen (1985); Kaplan and
Matteis (1968); and Carlson, Weisberg, and Goldstein (1984).
But they also were asked to estimate the percentage of revenues that
would be lost in 2002 as a result of occupational fraud and abuse. As
the median ﬁgure was 6 percent, using an estimate for U.S. GDP of
$10.4 trillion in 2002 leads to an estimate of $625 billion. No effort
was made to adjust for nonresponse or to ask whether respondents
were in fact in a position to make such estimates. Nor did the study
consider whether GDP was the correct base for these calculations. If
each examiner estimated the share of the ﬂow through his or her cor-
poration, then the right base was much larger, namely the total volume
of transactions through corporations.50
In advanced economies in which insurance is commonplace, reve-
nues from crimes involving stolen goods (burglary, larceny, and rob-
bery) are probably overestimated, since they are based on the reported
value of the stolen property. A victim may inﬂate the worth of an item
50 See Levi and Pithouse (forthcoming) for a critical review of other fraud survey data.
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to receive a higher insurance payment. From the point of view of earn-
ings from crime, even if the claimed amount is accurate, a fence or
pawnbroker will not pay a thief the retail value for pilfered goods;
indeed, the standard ﬁgure used in research studies is that fences pay
20–30 percent of the market value of the good, depending on how
easily it can be resold (Muscato 2003).
Even the estimates of revenues from drug sales, by far the most
systematically developed, should be seen as having very broad conﬁ-
dence intervals, though the government publishes only point estimates.
One can get a sense of the uncertainty of these revenue estimates by
examining revisions in the related estimates of the number of drug
addicts that are published along with the income estimates. When cal-
culated in 2000, the estimated number of U.S. heroin addicts for 1992
was 630,000; in 2001 this 1992 ﬁgure was revised up to 945,000 (Ofﬁce
of National Drug Control Policy 2000, 2001). Estimating the preva-
lence of a rare behavior, particularly one that leads to erratic lifestyles,
is difﬁcult, resulting in a corresponding uncertainty. When one takes
into account the range in estimates in the numbers of drug addicts,
the $70 billion estimate of revenues from drug sales in 2000 is probably
best thought of as somewhere between $35 billion and $105 billion,
with no particular central tendency (Ofﬁce of National Drug Control
Policy 2000, 2001).
Outside of the United States, estimates of criminal earnings are
sparser and often equally implausible. Blades and Roberts (2002) report
a small number of such estimates for OECD and transition economies.
Their ﬁgures, admittedly partial and essentially guesstimates, are usu-
ally in the range of 0.5–1.0 percent of GDP.
Even taken at face value, these numbers are only weakly related to
money laundering. Much of this income is earned by people who use
the cash to directly purchase legal goods without making use of any
ﬁnancial institution. Small-time thieves earning $25,000 annually are
unlikely to make use of a bank or any other means of storing or trans-
ferring value.51 It is impossible to estimate or even guess as to what
share of these revenues will require laundering.
3. Conclusions. Neither of the two types of broad approaches to
51 In most jurisdictions, the use of money acquired by illegal means to cover living
expenses or operating costs is technically considered (self-) money laundering and often
can be prosecuted under AML statutes. However, this is not an aspect of the general
phenomenon of money laundering that by itself would rise to the level of a public policy
problem. Nor do such prosecutions occur frequently.
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estimate how much money is laundered—examining incomes in the
broadly deﬁned underground economy or incomes from criminal ac-
tivities—provides numbers that meet minimal standards for policy
guidance. The ﬁndings can support only the broadest statements about
the extent of laundering activities. The underground economy, and
even the criminal economy, probably amount to hundreds of billions
of dollars each in the United States. However, this statement provides
no possible guidance for assessing the effectiveness of money-launder-
ing controls by comparing the volume of money laundered across time
or nations. If an estimate rises by 10 percent from one year to the next,
it is as likely to be the result of changes in coverage or estimating
technique as to be a change in the actual size of the underground
economy or of criminal earnings.
Money laundering is a diverse and substantial activity. We examine
now the efforts to enforce laws against laundering as a method for
reducing crime.
III. Enforcement
One of two pillars of the AML regime is enforcement, consisting of
the listing of predicate offenses and the investigation, prosecution, and
sanctioning of launderers and their customers. Whereas the prevention
pillar can be described through document review, we are now, except
for the predicate offense list, into the conventional criminal justice
territory of statistics that are meager and difﬁcult to interpret. After
discussing the issue of what offenses are listed as predicate crimes, this
section describes enforcement in the United States and United King-
dom, for reasons of both parochialism and data availability. We include
analysis of the volume of SARS because though produced by the pre-
vention pillar, they are principally used by enforcement agencies.
Though only shards of data are available on other nations, the United
States appears to be vastly more aggressive in its enforcement activities;
in many countries there appears to be minimal use of criminal statutes
for AML purposes.
A. Predicate Offenses
The decision about which offenses to list as predicate crimes or
whether to opt for the more common approach of criminalizing the
laundering of all “serious crimes” is one that has entangled the United
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States and other nations in complex and sometimes acrimonious ne-
gotiations.52
However, consistent with the FATF’s original mandate, the list of
predicate money-laundering crimes in the 2003 FATF Forty Recom-
mendations does not include tax evasion. This does more than reveal
a lack of uniformity in the global AML regime; it can also undercut
cooperation and mutual legal assistance under treaties.
Foreign or domestic tax evasion—other than failure to pay U.S. taxes
on the proceeds of a crime—does not qualify as a predicate crime in
the U.S. AML system. While U.S. prosecutors can work around this
lacuna and do not regard it as an impediment to an effective U.S. AML
regime, the absence of foreign tax evasion as a predicate offense under
U.S. law is often cited as impeding international cooperation.53 Latin
American leaders, for example, often complain privately that while the
United States insists on cooperation on issues it considers important,
the country itself often fails to cooperate on issues of importance to
other countries, such as evasion of taxes on assets held abroad.
B. Investigation
Before we brieﬂy review investigation methods, it may be helpful if
we summarize sources of intelligence that may drive them: ﬁrst, sus-
picious transaction or activity reports made by bankers and other reg-
ulated persons; second, collapses of professional ﬁrms or business en-
terprises that generate information about culpable involvement of
intermediaries; third, investigations—sometimes involving criminal and
undercover police informants—into major crime networks that throw
up suspicions and evidence of active assistance by laundering agents
52 The FATF (2003) deﬁnition of “serious offenses” requires a maximum penalty of
more than one-year imprisonment or a minimum of more than six months. In some
jurisdictions, this would exclude some tax and exchange control offenses, and Switzerland
criminalizes tax fraud (falsiﬁcation on tax returns for those who have to complete them
domestically) but not tax evasion. Some countries such as France include tax evasion as
a money-laundering offense in their national legislation but undercut the inclusionbecause
the offense is not reportable by ﬁnancial institutions. The FATF also designates twenty
broad categories of offense that include corruption, bribery, market manipulation, and
environmental crimes.
53 Such criticism is not directed only at the United States. Many ﬁnancial centers are
accused of noncooperation on tax matters (and sometimes counter that both tax and other
fraud charges—e.g., those coming out of Russia—are politically motivated). For example,
an IMF (2001, p. 24) review of Cyprus observed that international cooperation would
be strengthened if Cyprus were to clarify that tax evasion is an offense under its money-
laundering laws and regulations.
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such as bankers and lawyers; and fourth, the boldness and powers of
the investigative authorities and their priorities.
In the reactive model, information on suspected customers or trans-
actions is sent by regulated entities (such as banks) to the FIU and
then distributed to law enforcement authorities for follow-up. Here
the universal message from the modest research that has been con-
ducted is that the proportion of SARs in high-reporting jurisdictions
that are actually seriously followed up is low, though the extent to
which this is inherent or merely resource-constrained remains unclear
(see Gold and Levi [1994], KPMG [2003], and Fleming [2005] for
three British studies that try to analyze the ﬁnancial intelligence pro-
cess end-to-end).
Many reports are of matters that arouse suspicion in the minds of
the bankers or professionals but are difﬁcult to resolve without inter-
viewing the client, which would tip the latter off. So expectations of
high prosecution and/or criminal asset yield from SARs may be un-
realistic, even without “defensive reporting” by regulated entities to
avoid risk of prosecution.54
The more that ﬁnancial intelligence is embedded into the routine
investigations of serious crimes for gain and terrorism, the greater the
likelihood that such intelligence is used. However, beyond the use of
routine and suspicious transaction reports, there is considerable vari-
ation across nations in terms of what investigative techniques are al-
lowed. Recommendation 27 of FATF (2003) endorses investigative
techniques such as “controlled delivery, undercover operations and
other relevant techniques,” but not explicitly sting operations, which
raise agent provocateur issues in several European jurisdictions. Juris-
dictions also differ in their standards and procedures to enforce due
process, human rights, and privacy. The U.S. Casablanca undercover
operation in 199855 was regarded as a resounding success in the United
States, but the operation’s aftermath created tensions with Mexico, in
particular. In February 2004, four bankers convicted in Mexican courts
54 However, from the enforcement perspective, one important trend toward greater
use of money-laundering reporting is data sharing both internally (linking databases so
that SARs can be matched against intelligence, law enforcement, tax, and social security
data) and externally (the European Commission–sponsored FIU.net project within the
European Union, with wider potential at least for sharing names within the globalEgmont
Group of FIUs).
55 Casablanca was the name of an extensive investigation of Mexican and other foreign
banks and bankers by U.S. federal agencies. It resulted in numerous indictments of
Mexican citizens for laundering of drug-dealing proceeds.
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TABLE 6
Money-Laundering Defendants and Convictions, 1994–2001
Year
ML as Any
Charge
ML as Primary
or Secondary
Charge
Percent with ML
as Primary or
Secondary
Charge Convictions
1994 1,907 1,341 70 933
1995 2,138 1,487 70 906
1996 1,994 1,457 73 1,080
1997 2,376 1,619 68 1,108
1998 2,719 1,831 67 1,199
1999 2,656 1,885 71 1,371
2000 2,503 1,771 71 1,329
2001 2,110 1,480 70 1,243
SOURCE.—Data from Administrative Ofﬁce of the Courts, criminal master ﬁle.
in connection with the operation were released when the U.S. sting
operation was declared unconstitutional under Mexican law. This sup-
ported allegations of biased targeting, since no major G-7 jurisdiction-
headquartered bank has been selected for this sort of money-launder-
ing sting exercise.
C. Prosecutions and Convictions
Available data on money-laundering charges in the United States—
which come from judicial sources for the federal level and from surveys
of inmates in federal and state prisons—cover the number of persons
charged, convicted, and imprisoned in federal courts.56 Charges can be
brought against both the customer who seeks to have money laundered
and the provider of the service; the data do not distinguish between
these two types of offenders.
1. Court Data. The analysis presented here primarily refers to the
Administrative Ofﬁce of the Court (AOC) data (Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics 2003), although U.S. Sentencing Commission data are also used
to provide some additional insights.57
Table 6 shows that the total number of defendants charged with
56 Judicial data on state court convictions are not available, although the inmate survey
presented in more detail below reinforces a general impression that there are few con-
victions in state court on such charges.
57 The data sets are different because the U.S. Sentencing Commission data reﬂect
only those who were sentenced in a given year, whereas the AOC data reﬂect all matters
related to a criminal charge that were conducted in a given year. For example, some of
those convicted in 1999 were not sentenced until 2000.
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money laundering rose from 1994 to 1998 and then fell sharply
through 2001. Slightly more than 2,100 persons were charged with
money-laundering offenses in 2001, compared with more than 2,700
in 1998; only twenty-two businesses were criminally convicted in 2001.
For about 30 percent of those charged with money laundering, the
offense was not one of the two most serious charges. Table 6 also shows
the number of convictions for which money laundering was the lead
offense, which is not necessarily the offense with the highest statutory
penalty but normally the one that generated the investigation. In the
vast majority of these cases (81–88 percent), those charged were con-
victed.
What predicate crimes generate money-laundering convictions? In
this respect, there is a signiﬁcant difference between those charged
with money laundering as the lead offense and those for whom it was
a secondary offense. For about 60 percent of the ﬁrst group (which
constitutes two-thirds of the total), a property offense (embezzlement
or fraud) was the predicate crime, and for only one in six the predicate
crime was a drug offense. However, among the smaller group whose
lead charge was not money laundering, about 90 percent were charged
with drug trafﬁcking. That is probably the consequence of differences
in maximum statutory sentences. Drug offenders face longer sentences
than those convicted of money laundering, so drug money launderers
are more likely to be charged with the drug offense if they had any
involvement beyond pure money laundering.
U.S. Sentencing Commission data in table 6 provide another view
on the same matter, since they include other charges that resulted in
convictions, such as embezzlement for self in addition to laundering
for others.58 Of the 1,543 defendants sentenced under one or more
money-laundering statutes in 2000, 590 were sentenced only for money
laundering. If we expand the latter category to include cases involving
money-laundering statutes and statutes for conspiracy or being the
principal offender, nearly half of those convicted may have been in-
volved only in the laundering and not in other aspects of the crimes,
although there is no way to know whether they were customers or
providers of money laundering.
Table 6 shows that for both 1995 and 2000, 30 percent of all defen-
dants convicted of money laundering were also convicted of drug of-
58 Data are not available to compare predicate offenses and these other charges.
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fenses. Of 255 cases in which a Title 31 offense59 was one of the
charges, 223 (87 percent) had no non-money-laundering charges.
Interestingly, of all persons convicted of drug offenses in federal
court, only 1.5 percent were also convicted of money laundering. This
ﬁgure was not much different from the proportion of those convicted
of fraud who were also convicted of money laundering (1.2 percent).
The dominance of drugs among secondary charges for money laun-
dering reﬂects the dominance of drug offenses in the federal criminal
justice system. About 60 percent of federal prison inmates have been
convicted of drug offenses.
Money-laundering sentences averaged about thirty-six months, sub-
stantially less than the average of approximately forty-eight months for
all those convicted in federal court (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).
Seventeen percent of those sentenced under the guidelines were given
longer sentences because they had leadership roles. About 20 percent
of the cases involved more than $1 million in funds (U.S. Treasury
2002, p. 5). The mean sentence for cash or monetary instrument smug-
gling (Title 31) was 19.6 months; for structuring transactions, 13.4
months; and for failure to report a currency transaction, 8.5 months.
These results are consistent with the conjecture that most of these
cases are pure money laundering, usually with a low-level offender who
does nothing else but some illegal legwork for the “predicate criminal.”
Once again, however, it must be emphasized that the role may be in
delivering the funds to the launderer rather than providing the actual
service.
The United States stands out in terms of the aggressiveness of its
criminal enforcement. Even the United Kingdom, discussed below, has
vastly fewer cases per capita.
2. Prison Data. The court data have signiﬁcant limitations because
not every successful money-laundering investigation results in a con-
viction for money laundering, as opposed to some other offense. For
example, the prosecutor may drop the money-laundering charge in
return for a plea to another charge related to the predicate offense
itself. That money-laundering charges usually result from investiga-
tions that began with another crime (Joseph 2001) reinforces the con-
cern about the comprehensiveness of the ﬁgures. Fortunately, some
59 These Title 31 U.S. Code offenses are mainly monetary reporting/recording offenses
such as cash smuggling, structured transactions, and failure to ﬁle required reports.
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other data throw light on how many money launderers are in prison,
regardless of the offense of conviction.
Approximately every ﬁve years, the Bureau of Justice Statistics in-
terviews a large sample (about 18,000 in 1997) of inmates in both fed-
eral and state prisons. The questionnaire includes items on their crim-
inal activities, not restricted to those for which they were convicted.
These data provide an important supplement to the administrative
data. Questions in the most recent (1997) survey concerning money
laundering have been analyzed by Caulkins and Sevigny (personal com-
munication). Note that although these data are not directly comparable
to any year of court data, since most of those incarcerated in 1997 were
convicted in an earlier year, table 6 showed little change in the pattern
of convictions from 1995 to 2000.
Among federal prison inmates, 3,030 (2.8 percent of the total pop-
ulation) reported that they were serving time for a money-laundering
conviction. Two-thirds of those had some drug involvement and an-
other 18 percent reported forgery/fraud convictions.60 Including those
who said that they laundered drug money but were not convicted on
that charge, federal prisons in 1997 contained an estimated 4,416
money launderers (5 percent of the total population). Among those
who said that they laundered drug money, only about one-sixth (467)
were estimated to have had no other involvement with drugs.
None of the state prison inmates reported that they were currently
serving time for a money-laundering offense. However, an estimated
6,368 state prison inmates (0.6 percent of the total population) self-
reported that they did launder money, and in every case they reported
that the money involved came from drug offenses. This latter ﬁnding
is an artifact of the questionnaire, since only inmates reporting drug
convictions were asked about money-laundering activities. Only about
100 reported that they were money launderers exclusively; the others
said they were also drug dealers.
Many persons who launder money are in prison for other offenses,
particularly for drug offenses. Thus, though there appears to be a neg-
60 Some of the discrepancies between the inmate survey and the court data may reﬂect
the longer sentences of drug offenders; thus the prison population of money launderers
will be richer in drug money launderers than the population entering prison. The fact
that the inmate survey pertains to 1997, three years earlier than the most recent court
data, makes it difﬁcult to integrate all the sources of data, particularly since most of the
inmates had been convicted in earlier years. However, the court data suggest relatively
modest changes in the level and composition of convictions between 1995 and 2000–2001.
Therefore, we ignore here that difference in timing.
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ligible number of state-level convictions for money laundering, the
self-reported inmate data suggest that there are actually more money
launderers in state prison than in federal prison, even if money laun-
dering may have been a minor part of their drug-dealing activities and
they may have been customers rather than providers of money-laun-
dering services.
In the federal system, the court statistics (from both the AOC and
the U.S. Sentencing Commission) do not suggest a dominant role for
drugs. However, the inmate survey suggests that most of those in
prison on money-laundering charges were involved in drug dealing.
There do not appear to be many stand-alone launderers in the prison
system, though the reason may be that involvement in drug dealing
creates extra vulnerability to detection and evidence for prosecution.
D. Suspicious Activity Reports
In the United States, SARs have replaced currency transaction re-
ports as the primary source of AML information from ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and other reporting sources. Although CTRs still play a role—
more than 13 million of them were ﬁled in 2001, and 1.5 million were
at some point identiﬁed in the course of a criminal investigation
(FinCEN 2002)—SARs at this point are viewed by professionals in the
enforcement ﬁeld as more informative. The number of SAR ﬁlings in
the United Kingdom is much smaller, but larger per capita and per
dollar of gross national product.
1. The United States. The number of SARs ﬁled in the United
States increased from 52,000 in 1996 to 689,000 in 2004 (FinCEN
2005a). Little information is available on the underlying suspected ac-
tivity. For example, 55 percent of SARs ﬁled by depository institutions
between April 1, 1996, and December 31, 2004, were characterized
only as “violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/Structuring/Money
Laundering,” which is nonspeciﬁc. The only other large category was
check fraud, which accounted for 13 percent of the ﬁled reports.
The number of SARs related to terrorism predictably increased
sharply following September 11. Whereas, in September 2001, twenty-
seven SARs mentioned possible terrorism, another 1,342 terrorism-
related SARs were ﬁled in the following six months. The rate of re-
porting had decreased again within another year. In the six months
beginning October 2002, only 290 terrorism SARs were ﬁled. In the
second quarter of 2003, however, the number began to rise again in
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part because of the additional number of ﬁnancial institutions required
to ﬁle SARs—for example, money services businesses, casinos, and se-
curities and futures industries—and in part the war in Iraq and the
accompanying slight rise in terrorist incidents (FinCEN 2005b).
An encouraging trend has emerged with regard to the party initiating
terrorism-related SARs. In the six months after September 2001, 85
percent of these SARs were ﬁled because of apparent matches with the
names of individuals or entities provided to institutions by government
agencies. But from October 2002 onward, most such SARs were a
result of due diligence processes of ﬁnancial institutions themselves,
independent of any government-published lists; in fact, during the pe-
riod April 2003 through June 2004, 80 percent of SARs were proactive.
A review of those SARs indicates that several banks created internal
watch lists to alert tellers and other employees to customers’ previous
suspicious behavior.
However, though 177 ﬁnancial institutions have ﬁled SARs related
to terrorism, over a third of the reports from April 2003 to June 2004
came from just two banks. It is unlikely that terrorists rely on such a
small number of banks for most of their transactions; it suggests that
a few banks are much more alert than others. Sixty-eight terrorism
SARs (23.4 percent) were reported directly to law enforcement, mean-
ing that the violation was ongoing and required immediate attention.
The number of SARs ﬁled, like most criminal justice outputs, is an
inherently ambiguous indicator of changes in the phenomenon. A rise
in the number of SARs may reﬂect either an increase in money laun-
dering or increased stringency of the AML regime. The rate of in-
crease in recent years is so large that, with a caveat as to quality, there
is good reason to believe that it is the stringency of the regime that
has intensiﬁed. There are no events that would explain a comparable
increase in the incidence of money laundering.
SARs are of variable quality. One bank was described as having in-
vested in training its staff to ﬁle informative reports only when there
was indeed reasonable suspicion. However, sometimes the purpose of
ﬁling is primarily to protect the bank against charges of violating re-
porting requirements, with little focus on assisting the government. If
banks and other regulated ﬁrms feel a greater need to protect them-
selves against government sanctions by ﬁling reports, the increase in
numbers may not indicate improved diligence. Moreover, the increase
may be weakening the effectiveness of the regime in the process, by
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lowering the signal-to-noise ratio. Such discrepancies in efforts point
to the need to examine not merely the number of ﬁlings but the extent
to which they have resulted in detection and punishment of money-
laundering offenses.
For the six and a half–year period ending October 31, 2002, 940,000
SARs produced 70,000 direct referrals to federal law enforcement
agencies, of which almost half were to the FBI (FinCEN 2003). Un-
fortunately, there is no information on how many resulted in criminal
cases or contributed to cases.
The U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce (GAO) has periodically at-
tempted to ascertain the results of the SAR ﬁlings in terms of prose-
cutions and convictions. An early study (GAO 1998) found that state
ofﬁcials reported “limited or no investigative actions” from materials
supplied by FinCEN. Even today, it is unclear what information SARs
have produced to make criminal cases. Another GAO study (2002) that
examined all SARs involving credit cards during a two-year period
from October 1, 1999, to September 30, 2001, found 499 such ﬁlings,
of which seventy were referred to law enforcement agencies (thirty-
nine federal, thirty-one state or local). But the GAO noted that
FinCEN was unable to report whether any of these referrals resulted
in criminal prosecutions.
The requirement itself to ﬁle SARs can indirectly generate useful
information. For example, a small community bank in New York City
(Broadway National Bank) was identiﬁed as problematic because of a
lack of ﬁled SARs; it turned out that senior management had allowed
the bank to routinely accept deposits from drug dealers.
2. The United Kingdom. Concerns about the U.K. AML regime
have existed at least since 1992, when Gold and Levi (1994) conducted
a review. However, AML activities were not mainstreamed into the law
enforcement process until some serious thought was given to proceeds
of crime issues during and in the aftermath of the Cabinet Ofﬁce study
(Performance and Innovation Unit 2000). A study of the U.K. system
for SARs, funded by the British government (KPMG 2003), found an
extraordinary increase in the number of SAR ﬁlings since 2000: from
20,000 in 2000 to a projected 100,000 in 2003 (rising subsequently to
154,536 in 2004).61 According to the study, the increase reﬂects the
61 This rise is a fairly universal feature of jurisdictions: e.g., from 2001 to 2004, the
number of Dutch SARs doubled to 41,002; in Japan, they quintupled to 95,315 in 2004.
There has been a rise (though less marked) also in those jurisdictions in which accounts
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extension of AML requirements to lawyers and real estate agents. At
least 6 percent of a sample of SARs disseminated by the U.K. National
Crime Intelligence Service (NCIS) resulted in “a positive law enforce-
ment outcome (i.e., prosecution, conﬁscation, cash seizure, etc.),” and
another 5 percent were still being used in an active investigation.62 The
study also noted, however, that there was little feedback from law en-
forcement agencies to the ﬁling institutions.
The NCIS makes some claims about the impact of SARs on en-
forcement, broadly construed (http://www.ncis.co.uk/ﬁnancialintelli-
gence.asp, 2005). For example, a ﬁfth of disclosures received by the
Inland Revenue from the NCIS identiﬁed a new target and a quarter
led to new inquiries. In 2002 and 2003, 20–30 percent of the disclo-
sures disseminated to the National Terrorist Financial Investigation
Unit were stated either to have led to a longer-term investigation or
to have added substantially to an existing investigation.
Fleming (2005, p. v) echoes the ﬁndings of the Gold and Levi study
over a decade earlier. For example, Fleming found that information
technology systems commonly used allow for only limited SARs-
related analyses and that SARs may contain unclear reasons for sus-
picion or may relate to noncriminal activity. Law enforcement agencies
receive little guidance, training, or advice on the use of SARs. Along
these lines, there is no larger accountability for either law enforcement
agencies or the NCIS on the use of SARs; the regime has no real owner
to encourage solid performance, to effect change, and to coordinate
the SARs-related activity of numerous government departments and
agencies. Neither is there a mission statement that clearly sets out the
aims of the regime. On the more positive side, smaller-scale studies on
metropolitan police data suggest greater potential for linking SARs
with existing investigations if ﬁeld ofﬁcers use the database (Fleming
2005, pp. 38–42).
Taken together, these reviews amount to a fairly serious indictment
of the lack of strategic end-to-end processing in a loose-coupled law
enforcement and regulatory system that is both expensive and intrusive
of privacy. This is not perhaps quite as critical as the 9/11 Commission
are automatically frozen following the making of a report. Jurisdictions that track all wire
transfers mostly reﬂect ﬂuctuations in the economy (see Austrac 2004).
62 Given that the researchers were unable to track the ultimate use of most of the
sample of SARs, this is the least favorable presentation of the data. By the most favorable
analysis, one-third of SARs resulted in a law enforcement success, mostly as intelligence
rather than as evidence for prosecution.
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report but has generated a signiﬁcant frisson in the ﬁnancial intelligence
and enforcement community and a further review in 2005–6 by the
chairman of the newly created Serious Organised Crime Agency, which
took over responsibility for the dissemination of SARs from NCIS
(which it absorbed when it began operations in 2006).
We include here the little data available on criminal enforcement in
the United Kingdom. In England and Wales, there were only ﬁfty-
four convictions for money laundering in 2004, a rise from 357 pros-
ecutions for violations of money-laundering statutes in the twelve years
from 1987 to 1998 (KPMG 2003).63 Though the U.K. Financial Ser-
vices Authority has subsequently made AML a major priority, the sense
of strategy in criminal investigations and prosecutions was lacking at
that time. That view was reinforced by a review of the AML regime
in the United Kingdom by the IMF, which found that enforcement
was limited even though the structure and laws for it were in place.
The report went on to state that “cases are generally considered for
enforcement only when there is little likelihood that they will be se-
riously contested or complicated. . . . The Crown Prosecution Service
does not prosecute any matters other than narcotic money laundering”
(IMF 2003, p. 100).64 In 2000 and the ﬁrst half of 2001, the report
continued, there were only eighteen “skilled-person” visits to ﬁnancial
institutions focusing on AML issues (IMF 2003, pp. 100, 102).65
E. Seizures and Forfeitures
Given the nature of money laundering as an offense, prosecution of
it, unlike prosecution of a violent crime, can be expected to generate
substantial ﬁnancial penalties. The government may seize the laun-
dered money and other assets of those charged and seek forfeiture
upon their conviction. In some cases, these seizures and forfeitures can
generate very substantial amounts: a prominent case involving a Bank
63 Data were not available for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
64 This remains broadly correct even though the IMF may not have considered fully
prosecutions for tax fraud by what were then HM Inland Revenue and HM Customs
and Excise, and for serious or complex nontax fraud by the Serious Fraud Ofﬁce. Sub-
sequent to this and in order to implement the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002—itself a
reﬂection of a major shift in approach by the U.K. government—there have been sig-
niﬁcant enhancements of investigation, prosecution, and cash seizure regimes in the
United Kingdom.
65 The Financial Services Authority has stepped up its focus on AML since then (see
Robinson 2005), but there remain generic problems in applying risk concepts to non-
prudential areas.
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Money Laundering 345
of New York ofﬁcial in 1999 resulted in criminal forfeitures of $8.1
million (U.S. Treasury 2002, p. A-15).
The total amounts the federal government orders in ﬁnes and res-
titution increased from $100 million in 1996 to $665 million in 2001.
The data, provided by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, reﬂect the
growth in the size of the average order rather than the number of
orders. The relevant metric to assess this ﬁgure is the total volume of
funds laundered. If one chooses an estimated total ﬁgure toward the
lower end of the usual range, such as $300 billion, then the current
level of seizures is almost trivial, only 0.2 percent. However, if the total
ﬁgure is only a few tens of billions—or at least if the forms of money
laundering of greatest social concern are only a few tens of billions—
then the level of seizures might be 1–3 percent, perhaps enough to
have a modest deterrent effect on those tempted to commit the pred-
icate crimes.
A report by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2000) of the U.K.
Cabinet Ofﬁce on the use of conﬁscation orders also found that the
system performed poorly in the United Kingdom. For nondrug crimes
in 1998, for example, only 136 conﬁscations were ordered and £6 mil-
lion collected—less than half of what was ordered to be conﬁscated.
For drug cases the numbers were larger, but only £10 million were
collected in a market estimated to total some billions of pounds in
revenues. Since then, the system has been toughened substantially by
the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002, which includes not only joint
police-customs Regional Asset Recovery Teams but also a new Asset
Recovery Agency (roughly based on the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau)
to pursue civilly and via taxation the assets of suspected criminals ir-
respective of prosecution or conviction. In 2004, there were 709 con-
ﬁscation orders made in drug-trafﬁcking cases, and additionally, for-
feiture orders were made in two-thirds of drug cases on usually modest
amounts of property used in the commission of offenses (Home Ofﬁce
2005). Some £81 million has been conﬁscated and civilly forfeited in
2004–5, some three-quarters of it via cash seizures under new inland
powers (personal communication). There remain very substantial assets
(over twice the above ﬁgure) on which conﬁscation orders have been
made but not enforced, and reducing this attrition is a prime target of
U.K. enforcement bodies.
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F. Conclusions
It appears that no other nation prosecutes money-laundering of-
fenses as aggressively as the United States, which is a recurrent com-
plaint of U.S. ofﬁcials involved in international money-launderingmat-
ters. Even with the creation of systems that generate large numbers of
reports, there is little evidence of substantial criminal investigations
that are consistently pursuing substantial cases against violators. The
Netherlands, which has relatively sophisticated capability in criminal
intelligence and investigation of organized crime, may be an exception,
but even there the numbers of major cases remain small.
What might explain this apparent difference in AML efforts between
the United States and other wealthy nations with sophisticated ﬁnan-
cial and judicial systems? First, drug trafﬁcking, central to the creation
of the AML regime, has been a more signiﬁcant problem in the United
States than in any other industrial nation, in terms of both politics and
collateral social problems. Second, the United States launched a suc-
cessful prosecutorial campaign against the Maﬁa in the 1970s and
1980s that developed many of the legal tools and much of the orga-
nizational expertise for money-laundering prosecutions. Only in a very
few other nations (notably Italy) has organized crime prosecution been
prominent. Finally, the United States has a more aggressive law en-
forcement culture generally than most other nations.
These differences between the United States and the rest of the
world could be either exacerbated or reduced by the relatively new
concern with terrorist ﬁnancing. The new security agenda that has
developed most dramatically in the United States after 9/11 has re-
ceived a positive response in the European Union. Although there re-
main reservations in some E.U. countries about the circumstances that
should give rise to labeling as “terrorism” and about what telecom-
munications data should be kept, for how long, and who should have
access to them, it should be noted that even prior to the bombings in
Spain and England,66 a 2002 Eurobarometer poll suggested a similarly
66 The United States did suffer what to date is the largest number of deaths in one
terrorist incident, and the dramaturgy of that awful episode looms large in the collective
psyche. Of course, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (especially
Northern Ireland itself) have experienced a large number of terrorist deaths and incidents
since the 1960s as a result of indigenous non-Islamic armed struggles. In the United
Kingdom, the reduction of funds available to Irish paramilitaries has long been a policy
goal, and though the funds from crime were reduced by signiﬁcant structural changes
(Levi 2006), charitable donations—principally from the United States via Noraid—were
able to sustain the Irish Republican Army and other groups until the peace agreement
and 9/11 produced a change in American attitudes.
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high level of concerns about terrorism in the European Union and the
United States, with 82 percent of Western Europe fearing a terrorism
incident (European Commission 2003, table 1.13). The London and
Madrid bombings have also strengthened the commitment of Euro-
pean states to pursuing terrorist ﬁnances, though there is varying com-
mitment and much concern about the negative impact of AML mea-
sures on their minority populations and on whether alternative
remittance systems make formal AML controls unimportant (Passas
2005).
There remains uncertainty about what the effects are of the differ-
ential prosecution and sanctioning levels within Europe and between
Europe and the United States. If crime is as globalized as is often
believed, one might expect criminals (like licit manufacturers and ﬁ-
nancial services ﬁrms) to shift their centers of operations to foreign
countries or to outsource more functions where risks of incrimination
or sanctions are lower. There is some anecdotal evidence that in the
light of clampdowns on criminal assets in the Irish Republic (arguably,
a connected but distinct aspect of AML regimes), drugs trafﬁckers
moved to the United Kingdom and to the Netherlands. However, there
has been no systematic analysis of what fraction of offenders have not
moved their operations. This leads us naturally into the next section,
assessment of the impact of AML.
IV. Assessing Anti–Money Laundering Efforts
How should the effectiveness of the AML regime be assessed? Money
laundering itself is only the intermediate target; the true target is in-
stead the volume of predicate crimes, perhaps weighted in terms of
their harmfulness.67 Reduction in the volume of the money laundered
is not a conceptually strong measure of the effectiveness of the regime;
subtler outcome measures are needed. This section deals with the
problem of ﬁnding such measures to reduce crimes other than terror-
ism and bribery/kleptocracy, since the bulk of AML activities have been
67 A major U.K. Home Ofﬁce evidence-based review for 2005–6 aims to reweight the
objectives of the crime control process in terms of overall harm reduction, developing a
common metric for the relative weighting of all crimes. This seems to be analytically
defensible, even though very difﬁcult to operationalize in terms that will enable inter-
veners to judge whether one set of policing actions will reduce total harm more than
others, whether individually or as part of a basket of controls.
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devoted to such criminal activities as drugs, other illegal markets, and
white-collar crimes.
A. General Considerations
Writing over ten years ago, Braithwaite (1993) offered the only anal-
ysis of this question with a criminological base. At a time when money
laundering was almost exclusively concerned with drug revenues, he
enumerated the costs and beneﬁts that needed to be considered. For
beneﬁts, the central issue was whether money laundering would in-
crease prices enough to make any noticeable difference in drug con-
sumption and whether it would increase the number of serious of-
fenders being punished. On the cost side, in addition to drug-speciﬁc
issues (e.g., whether drug-related crime and monopolization of drug
markets would increase), he identiﬁed the costs of enforcement and
intrusions as the major considerations. We think that the diversiﬁcation
of AML to other activities also requires a broadening of the evaluative
framework.
AML helps reduce crime through two mechanisms. First, CDD and
other elements of the prevention pillar can make it more difﬁcult for
offenders either to carry out the crime (e.g., pay their suppliers) or to
obtain its full beneﬁts. In this respect, the controls have a prospective
effect. Second, SARs and other back-end activities can generate evi-
dence of a crime and link individuals to that crime, and SARs can also
become evidence for investigations that originate from other sources
or were already under way when the reports were made. SARs can also
inform the authorities of suspects’ assets of which they have no prior
knowledge and which, in a system lacking the capacity for centralized
information on who directly or indirectly owns speciﬁc ﬁnancial hold-
ings, they have no other obvious means of acquiring.68 In this sense,
SARs act retrospectively in that they not only increase the risk of crim-
inal sanction but also provide the basis for seizure of criminal proceeds.
In terms of crime control, the AML regime may generate two other
beneﬁts. First, it produces a form of condign punishment. Part of the
social appeal of proceeds of crime conﬁscation is the satisfaction that
offenders do not continue to enjoy the fruits of crime and even are
68 Persons subjected to executive orders, usually in connection with terrorist ﬁnance,
may have their names circulated. All banks check the list to see whether they have any
accounts directly or beneﬁcially owned by those persons, so that they can freeze funds;
but this is a tiny proportion of total suspects.
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visibly stripped of them. Seizure of funds generates revenue for the
government, and the incarceration of those who conspire to make the
proﬁts of crime appear legitimate punishes senior offenders. The sei-
zures attack the negative role models offered by offenders living “high
on the hog.” Research in Europe ﬁnds ample illustrations of law en-
forcement ofﬁcers stressing the pain that asset conﬁscation brings to
offenders, both in absolute terms and compared with at least European
levels of imprisonment (Levi and Osofsky 1995; Nelen 2004);69 though
plausible, this has not been independently veriﬁed on a large sample
of offenders.
The impact on the ability of others to offend is uncertain, but con-
viction or professional disqualiﬁcation of professional intermediaries
removes some crime facilitators and may have a disruptive effect on
some crime groups (Middleton and Levi 2005; Nelen and Lankhorst
2005). Moreover, given the stakes that ﬁnancial professionals have in
maintaining their employment and licensure, they may be relatively
deterrable; that is, unless they are being blackmailed or threatened or
unless they or their ﬁrms are at serious risk of going bust anyway,
modest expected risks of apprehension and punishment may be enough
to discourage many from participating.70 In some instances, the only
way to apprehend those principal offenders who separate themselves
from the predicate offenses is to convict them of money-laundering
offenses associated with predicate crimes that have been committed by
others. Such cases show that the law with respect to a wide range of
predicate crimes applies to everyone.
Second, AML systems may improve the efﬁciency of law enforce-
ment, an effect distinct from reducing predicate crime. Even if they do
not necessarily result in the government apprehending more offenders,
the existence and tools of the AML system may permit the same num-
ber of offenders to be captured and convicted at lower cost (at least
lower to the government; in this case, the externalities are paid for by
the private sector and by users of their services).
69 These are supported by interviews with U.K. law enforcement personnel, 2002–5.
70 Ironically, the very severity of employment sanctions for any drug taking or viewing
Internet pornography at workmakes ﬁnancial services staff readily vulnerable to blackmail;
the paucity of public cases revealing actual subornation is evidence of either signiﬁcant
underreporting or underexploitation of crime opportunities. See Levi (2002) and Simpson
(2002) for extended discussion of sanctions and corporate offenders.
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B. Market Model
A useful starting point to assess the relationship between the AML
regime and the reduction in predicate crime quantitatively is to view
money laundering as a market, with customers for, and suppliers of,
money-laundering services. Speciﬁc AML interventions can then be
linked to predicate crime reductions by how, through shifting the sup-
ply and demand, they affect the money-laundering market, particularly
the price of services and, thus, the returns from crime.
For example, if money laundering is more difﬁcult (expensive), then
drug dealers will face higher costs and charge higher prices for their
services, thus reducing the consumption of drugs. Assume that prior
to the creation of an AML regime, a high-level drug dealer charged
his customers (themselves lower-level dealers) $10,000 per kilogram of
cocaine and received $10 million annually in gross revenues. As a con-
sequence of the barriers imposed by the AML regime, assume that he
now has to pay 10 percent of the proceeds to the money launderer and
hence receives only $9 million. Under the assumption of competition
between drug dealers, which seems a reasonable characterization of
such a market (Caulkins and Reuter 1998), the $10 million previously
just compensated the dealer for risks (legal and otherwise) and other
costs. In the face of reduced net returns, the dealer will raise prices to
customers and, thus, increase the retail price of cocaine; numerous
studies have shown that even for addictive drugs there is a substantial
elasticity of demand (Manski, Pepper, and Petrie 2001 p. 43).
The same logic applies to other income-generating offenses such as
fraud and gambling. By creating a higher probability of detection and
punishment, the AML regime makes money laundering more risky for
both customers and providers. It raises the price of the service or the
costs of searching for the service (customers ﬁnding suppliers), which
in turn reduces the return from the predicate crime and thus the quan-
tity of these offenses. It also brings in a set of different offenders who
may be in a position to “trade” information about the primary traf-
ﬁckers in exchange for nonprosecution or reduced sentences. In this
framework, the analytic task is to estimate how much AML interven-
tions raise the price of money laundering and the price elasticity of
offending with respect to the price of money-laundering services.
What determines the demand for, and supply of, money-laundering
services? The demand for money-laundering services can be thought
of as a function of two factors. First is the distribution and volume of
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Money Laundering 351
criminal revenues. Since scrutiny of sources of criminal earnings for
low earners is limited (except in the aftermath of divorces and other
such transactions in which lawyers may suspect undeclared income and
generate SARs, as in the United Kingdom, where the regulations bite)
and because low earners do not need to transform (launder) the money
they make, it is probably only criminal incomes of more than perhaps
$50,000 annually that create a need for concealing the source of the
revenues.
The second is the other costs of laundering money, such as the time
it takes to ﬁnd a supplier and the risk of the search. Both are inﬂuenced
by the intensity of enforcement of the AML regime. Money-launder-
ing customers face a risk of legal and ﬁnancial penalties if they transact
with unreliable suppliers of laundering services. Some potential pen-
alties are derivative of supplier-oriented risk; the launderer can mitigate
the penalty by turning in the customer who has committed the pred-
icate offense. In addition, the continuing presence in some jurisdictions
of sting operations, in which the government simulates the behavior
of a launderer, poses a separate risk to the customer. That risk may be
manifested in the time it takes for customers to ﬁnd a provider to
whom they assign a low probability of being a government agent.
The supply of money-laundering services is determined primarily by
the stringency of the AML regime. Without the prevention pillar of
the AML regime and with only a rudimentary enforcement pillar as-
sociated with tracing proceeds of crime back to their source, the cost
of laundering those proceeds would surely be low, but not zero. Prior
to the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, criminals could deposit the cash pro-
ceeds (no matter how large) from their crimes in local banks with no
questions asked by the bank (placement), move them around the world
(layering), and enjoy them at their leisure (integration). Criminals and
their banks were subject to ex post investigation, but when authorities
do not have seizure and conﬁscation powers and once the proceeds
were safely outside the jurisdiction, risks to the “primary offenders”
would be minimal, though anyone—including ﬁnancial facilitators—
who remained within the jurisdiction might be indicted as part of a
conspiracy such as RICO or Continuing Criminal Enterprise if it could
be shown that they had the requisite degree of guilty knowledge.71
71 Legislative details vary, but this logic applies to non-U.S. common law and to civil
law, e.g., continental European jurisdictions. For example, sanctions against membership
of “criminal organizations”—a problematic term—are mandated within the European
Union.
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Indeed in theory, even without money-laundering legislation, bankers
might have been signiﬁcantly at risk once law enforcement agencies
developed this crime reduction model, since they were more likely than
primary offenders to be locked into domestic life and therefore less
geographically mobile.
Today, it is reasonable to assume that money launderers face no costs
other than those posed by law enforcement such as seizure of assets
and incarceration and the same kinds of reputational losses associated
with any kind of sanction for white-collar offenses. The time involved
in actually laundering funds is minimal. Some of the price charged for
money-laundering services may reﬂect skill in the methods used for
hiding the origins of money, but one can assume that such skills are
in ready supply and that enough of those with the skills can be per-
suaded to commit this crime for an appropriately high fee. Conse-
quently, incarcerating, say, a few hundred launderers will not reduce
the pool of competent labor substantially, though it may raise the price
that has to be paid to obtain that labor, redistributing criminal income
and inducing entry by new participants as well as, perhaps, taking out
of the market those who fear professional stigma or incarceration.
The effective cost of money-laundering services is not fully reﬂected
in the price charged. In addition to search time, there is the risk of
sanction by the state(s)72—especially in a global enforcement environ-
ment marked by FATF pressure to reduce privacy rights—and fraud
by the provider. Quality among suppliers may be differentiated, re-
ﬂecting an institution’s or individual’s capacity to deliver services re-
liably, a particularly important consideration in the criminal world.
Thus, paradoxically, an observed reduction in prices may reﬂect a shift
from higher- to lower-quality money-laundering services.
C. Multiple Markets
An important analytic complexity is that there may be more than
one market for money-laundering services, depending on the predicate
offense and the amount that needs to be protected. For example, as
was suggested by prior examples, laundering $1 million in drug reve-
nues from the United States to Mexico may require a higher-percent-
age payment than laundering the same amount in a bankruptcy fraud,
simply because the launderer of drug money incurs risks of more likely
72 This can be the jurisdictions in which the primary offenses occurred and also those
in which the laundering occurred.
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investigation and more serious penalties from law enforcement as well
as greater potential physical risks from the customer (violent retaliation
for failure to protect assets). If the transaction involves actual cash, it
may also be more expensive (per dollar) to launder large sums than
small, for the same reasons.
Launderers may also specialize, in terms of either the kinds of funds
they accept or the kinds of institutions with which they transact.
Money laundering is also differentiated by phase; some launderers may
not provide full-service operations. For example, a simple currency
exchange bureau may only move money out of the United States
(placement) but not provide for the layering of the money so that it
can no longer be traced, or bring it back into the United States, where
the funds can be freely used with no questions asked (integration).
Black-market peso brokers, by contrast, often serve both the supply
and the demand ends of the market. They ﬁrst export the narco-dollars
to Colombia (or arrange to purchase them for resale in the United
States), then exchange them for pesos for the cartels’ domestic use, and
ﬁnally provide dollars to Colombian importers who wish to avoid the
costs and bureaucracy of obtaining dollars legally. Thus the proceeds
of drug sales in the United States may resurface, cleaned, in the ac-
counts of U.S. companies that sell their products to Colombian busi-
nesses. A similar logic may be involved in the facilitation of cross-
border transfers by hawaladars (sometimes local shopkeepers) who
match currency transfers between jurisdictions, who merely have to
“net out” the balances, often in jurisdictions such as the United Arab
Emirates (Passas 2005).
One segment of the market for money-laundering services may con-
sist of launderers employing a variety of methods for servicing custom-
ers, depending on the customers’ speciﬁc needs. In this conventional
market, the providers have multiple and independent customers and
recruit agents (e.g., bank ofﬁcials, casino employees) to assure that they
can provide a range of services. Customers, who know other customers
with whom they share information, shift among launderers depending
on the price and quality of service. For example, there is anecdotal
evidence that drug dealers, circumspect though they may be, do share
information about money launderers.
Another segment of the market consists of almost accidental cus-
tomer-agent relationships. Customers do not ﬁnd professional money
launderers whose principal activity is providing those services, but
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rather seek out corrupt employees of ﬁnancial intermediaries who ser-
vice only one or a small number of clients as a by-product of their
legitimate occupations. To the extent that the launderer might have an
interest in servicing more than one client, search costs are high for
both sides (though more for the customer), reﬂecting risks of disclosing
need or availability and the lack of any organizing focal point for
search.
For example, one ﬁnancier allowed a single drug trafﬁcker to use his
company to establish a source of funds. The trafﬁcker gave cash to the
ﬁnancial ofﬁcer to deposit in a company account, and the funds were
then transferred to Monaco for the ostensible purpose of buying Goya
paintings. The paintings were fakes and, moreover, were never shipped,
and the drug trafﬁcker was the beneﬁciary of the payments for the fake
Goyas, receiving the million dollar transfers. There was no evidence
that the ﬁnancier’s business provided money-laundering services for
other clients (FATF 1998).
Both types of operations are components of the market. Some cus-
tomers in high-risk occupations (e.g., cigarette smugglers) with con-
tinuing needs in a number of locations may seek out specialized laun-
derers. Others who have a one-time need may be content to ﬁnd an
acquaintance capable and willing to provide the service just to one
customer. There is also self-laundering, for example, through acquisi-
tion of a small business that does not arouse suspicions or (in the
United States) is on the “exempt” list at a bank (i.e., for which it is
not necessary to ﬁle a CTR for large cash transactions that are con-
sistent with the regular pattern of the business). No one at the bank
or any professional except perhaps a forgiving accountant needs to be
involved, at least in the placement stage. The Egmont Group (2000)
tells of a Western European family of drug trafﬁckers that ran a cur-
rency exchange bureau that served as both a cash-intensive front com-
pany and a means of laundering money. The rise of artiﬁcial tanning
and nail parlors in the United Kingdom is an illustration of such a
cash-hiding self-laundering potential, especially since tax agencies do
not proﬁt from and are not set up to investigate overreporting of tax-
able income.
Although professional money launderers certainly exist,73 they are
73 In Dutch organized crime investigations in 2004, a third of those under investigation
were described as having laundering as their primary and another third as a secondary
aspect of their criminal work; the signiﬁcance of laundering to the ﬁnal third was unknown
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surprisingly infrequent in reported cases. A great deal of the revenue
from crimes is self-laundered. Robert Maxwell, then a ﬂamboyant press
lord and member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, laundered
hundreds of millions of dollars from the pension funds of his U.K.
company employees through U.S. and other banks (some of which
were also defrauded by him) (Bower 1996). Other people may have
aided him, but there is no evidence that anyone was an independent
provider of laundering services, not least because until after his death,
no one in authority knew that he was committing fraud. Terrorist ﬁ-
nancing cases also seem to involve people who belong very much to
the cause rather than being mere commercial launderers; the latter,
after all, might be more likely to trade in their sources in exchange for
liberal ofﬁcial treatment in relation to other potential criminal liabili-
ties.74
This is important for both policy and research purposes. The ra-
tionale behind the current AML regime is based in part on the implicit
assumption that the regime provides tools to apprehend and punish a
set of actors who provide a critical service for the commission of certain
kinds of crime and who had previously been beyond the reach of the
law—an assumption that makes the market model a useful heuristic
device for analyzing the effects of laws and programs.
However, if money laundering is mostly done by predicate offenders
or by nonspecialized confederates, then the regime accomplishes much
less. There is no new set of offenders, just a new set of charges against
the same offenders, and the potential gains from the additional tool
represented by the AML regime, while valuable in increasing the ef-
ﬁciency of law enforcement, are likely to be substantially more modest
than posited (Cue´llar 2003). The extent to which the modesty of gains
is a function of the modesty of enforcement resources would be a mat-
ter of much dispute; we present the relevant information in the next
section.
For research purposes, the prominence of the amateur launderer
implies that the market model concept is a strained analogy. Price may
not be well deﬁned to most participants because the service is rarely
purchased and the providers are poorly informed. Risk may also be
(Council of Europe 2006). We are not in a position to test these ascriptions, but van
Duyne and Levi (2005) note the relative lack of sophistication in those laundering schemes
that make it through to ﬁnal conviction after appeals.
74 In addition, terrorism is often bad for general criminal as well as legitimate business.
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hard to observe because it is derivative from participation in other
elements of the crime. Assessing how interventions increase risks and
prices for those transactions that do involve stand-alone launderers will
have only modest value. Finally, stand-alone service providers may be
scarce.
Thus the market model may work well for some kinds of predicate
offenses and offenders but less well for others. How this element of
heterogeneity in the money-laundering underworld affects the research
agenda for conceptualizing optimal AML regimes is taken up in the
ﬁnal section.
D. Performance Measures
To what extent does the market framework help assess the effective-
ness of an AML regime in reducing predicate crime? While useful for
analyzing some of the basic questions, the available data do not permit
application for assessing effectiveness. One source of difﬁculty is that
the price of money-laundering services itself is not an adequate indi-
cator. Enforcement aims at both the demand and supply sides.
Demand-side efforts such as stings against customers have the effect
of lowering observed prices. By raising the nonmoney cost of pur-
chasing money laundering, which now includes some risk of arrest,
incarceration, and ﬁnancial penalties, such stings reduce demand. Sup-
ply-side efforts directed at the launderers should raise the price. Both
efforts should reduce the quantity of laundering and the net returns
from crime, the ultimate goal, but price then can only be interpreted
along with estimates of quantity.
An alternative performance measure for assessing the effectiveness
of the AML regime in controlling predicate crime is the volume of
predicate offenses. Apart from the problem of developing a counter-
factual—how much predicate crime would have occurred without the
AML regime?—there is a fundamental problem of measuring predicate
offense levels.
Consider again illegal drugs, the best-studied of the activities gen-
erating a demand for money laundering. While there are a number of
possible measures—total revenues, prices, or quantities consumed—
none is estimated precisely enough to be useful for analytical purposes,
even if we knew more about the volume and cost of drug money laun-
dering. For example, as previously mentioned, the error band around
existing drug revenue estimates for the United States is very large, with
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an ofﬁcial estimate of $70 billion in 2000 (Ofﬁce of National Drug
Control Policy 2001), which should be viewed as the center point of
a uniform distribution from $35 billion to $105 billion. A decline of
even 25 percent in a ﬁve-year period would be hard to detect with
conﬁdence.
Alternatively, one might use drug prices, since money-laundering
controls are expected to reduce drug use by raising the cost of distri-
bution rather than by reducing demand. A National Research Council
report (Manski, Pepper, and Petrie 2001) expressed considerable skep-
ticism that the current system of data collection for prices could detect
any but the very largest changes in prices (cf. Caulkins 2001). More-
over, there have been large revisions in the estimated prices for cocaine
and heroin for a given year in successive estimation efforts, reinforcing
the sense of frailty.75 Other potential measures such as the number of
dependent users or the quantity consumed are similarly estimated with
great imprecision.
The performance assessment situation is even less promising for
criminal offenses other than drug distribution. Systematic estimates of
the volume of these crimes or revenues are often not available or are
effectively made up from thin air. It is highly implausible, for example,
that one could reliably detect a reduction of 10 percent in the volume
of (or revenues from) embezzlement or corporate fraud. Though pri-
vate-sector data on payment card fraud are fairly reliable, it is far from
certain that much of the proceeds from such crimes needs to be laun-
dered; furthermore, as a proportion of all crime costs and beneﬁts to
offenders, such frauds are very modest (see Levi and Pithouse, forth-
coming). In some countries such as the United Kingdom, regular large-
sample victimization surveys for crimes with individual victims have
been developed that can be useful at area levels, but there is modest
understanding of what offenders get from reselling stolen property or
how much of this is laundered: so linkage with AML measures is dif-
ﬁcult.
Performance measurement is an increasingly important component
of responsive and responsible public policy, so the difﬁculty in ﬁnding
credible measures of AML regime performance in reducing crime is a
major problem. Perhaps more sophisticated versions of market models
75 The series produced by Abt Associates in 2001 (ONDCP 2001) differs from that
produced by RAND in 2004 (ONDCP 2004). For 1998, e.g., Abt estimated the retail
price of cocaine to be $190 (in 2002 dollars); the RAND-estimated price was $132.
This content downloaded from 131.251.254.13 on Fri, 21 Feb 2014 09:10:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
358 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter
will help in this respect, but their utility may remain problematic unless
data quality improves, a special problem if one is also trying to measure
the wider sociopolitical threat from criminal organizations or networks
as well as levels of criminal behavior.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the AML regime itself could have very
large effects on the extent of drug use. Low-level drug dealers earn too
little to require money-laundering services, yet they account for the
bulk of total earnings. Price markups along the distribution system
(conservatively estimated at 50 percent at each level) show that more
than 60 percent of revenues go to low-level wholesalers and retailers,
who are predominantly independent agents rather than employees of
larger crime organizations. At the peak of the crack cocaine market in
1988, average annual earnings of retail drug dealers in Washington,
DC, were estimated at $28,000 (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990).
More recent studies report much lower average earnings (Bourgois
1995; Levitt and Venkatesh 2000).
High-level dealers, the only ones who need money-laundering ser-
vices, account for no more than 25 percent of total drug revenues.
Assume that in the current regime money launderers charge customers
approximately 10 percent of the amount laundered. Now assume that
an improved system raised the price for money-laundering services by
half, to 15 percent. The result would be an increase in the price of
drugs of only 1.25 percent, far too small to be picked up by existing
monitoring systems. This is not an argument that money-laundering
controls are neither effective nor cost-effective, but only that their suc-
cess cannot be empirically assessed by examining prices and quantities
in drug markets.
Finally, we review one arena that has provided the most serious an-
alytical difﬁculties over performance measures: assessing the effective-
ness of terrorist ﬁnance controls (see Levi 2006). The 9/11 Commis-
sion stressed that ﬁnancing was only a part of the terrorism control
issue, but the “War on Terrorist Financing” continues to present a high
proﬁle around the world. The effectiveness statistic most often cited is
the amounts frozen following E.U., U.N. Security Council, and U.S.
designation of persons and organizations (including charities), but
these fairly modest sums ($112 million frozen worldwide to the end of
2005) tell us nothing about the size of the denominator. The cost of
terrorist ﬁnance would vary according to whether it is a gross cost
(which would include support during the planning stages, in the case
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of Islamic bombers perhaps starting with initial transportation to and
training in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Pakistan) or a net cost (which would
include only the resources necessary to pull off the job—explosives,
backpacks, cell phones, bribes to noncore participants, price paid for
inside information, etc.). The operational costs of the 9/11 attacks to-
taled $400,000–$500,000. A top end estimate for the costs of the Ma-
drid bombings in 2004 (including the Moroccan cannabis partially
traded for explosives) is $15,000, with the Bali bombings costing a little
more and the “7/7” London bombings of 2005 costing substantially
less76 (Economist 2005; interviews with U.K. and U.S. law enforcement
sources).
There is some debate in Western government circles as to whether
one should include within gross costs the ﬁnancing of religious intol-
erance that actively promotes or condones the use of violence against
other groups: the ﬁnancing of terror could then total funding of Wa-
habi or post-Salaﬁst madrassas (religious schools) and mosques around
the world (or, as some would counter, the funding of Zionist or fun-
damentalist Christian or rival Muslim activities that incite violence
among their adherents). However, almost none of those who have
bombed U.S. or Western European targets attended such places, mak-
ing direct causal connections and claims of preventative impact difﬁcult
to justify. The ﬁnancing prevention target could range from thousands
of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on the basis
for calculation.77 Given the modest operational costs, the preventative
performance needed to stop $10,000 or even $100,000 from falling into
terrorist hands would have to be extraordinary in the context of global
incomes from crime, let alone licit income. Rather, performance might
best be judged by stopping such sums from getting into the hands of
known and suspected terrorists or the leads to terrorists and their lo-
gistical supporters provided by the private sector and public ﬁnancial
76 One of the bombers of humble occupation left over $200,000 net in his estate,
suggesting that far more resources could have been available for this and other attacks,
and raising the question in our minds of why this was not distributed to other potential
terrorists before his death, if planned.
77 McCulloch and Pickering (2005) allege that the main purpose of controls on terrorist
ﬁnance is to suppress the charities and nongovernmental organizations in “civil society”
in order to reduce opposition to what they view as state crimes and repression. Irrespective
of whether or not their interpretation is correct or plausible, this illustrates a radically
pluralist approach to measuring performance, depending on judgments about their pur-
pose and as seen through the lenses of various (sometimes diametrically opposed)
stakeholders.
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investigation. National security considerations make it difﬁcult for out-
siders to assess the impact claims made by governments and critics
alike, but the acknowledgement that international terrorism is now
split up into smaller “Al-Qaeda-inspired” networks or disparate indi-
viduals makes ﬁnancial needs less for terrorist operations. This difﬁcult
issue brings us appropriately to the next aspect of AML impact—crim-
inal justice performance.
E. Improving Criminal Justice System Performance
We noted earlier that AML regimes might have two other beneﬁts
in addition to controlling crime: improving the efﬁciency of the system
or catching offenders who otherwise would escape. Cue´llar (2003) con-
cedes that such regimes might have improved efﬁciency in drug control
and in reducing a few related criminal activities but argues that they
have failed in the second area. The principal use to which the U.S.
AML regime has been put has been to increase the penalties with
which prosecutors can threaten predicate offenders. The regime has
had little success in apprehending professional money launderers or
high-level criminals. In Europe, there has been some activity against
professionals such as lawyers and bankers—though more by regulatory
than criminal sanctions—but the extent to which this has incapacitated
crime networks, reduced the variety of their offending, or reduced the
scale of their growth as “criminal organizations” remains unknown and
largely unanalyzed (Levi and Maguire 2004; Nelen 2004; van Duyne
and Levi 2005). There are limits in the extent to which the police (or,
for that matter, bankers) can pursue the rationale behind suspected
transactions without interviewing suspects. However, improved record-
ing of ﬁnancial accounts and greater attention to beneﬁcial ownership
of assets should logically help with asset recovery compared with post-
arrest or even postcharge ﬁnancial investigations that were common-
place previously; in this sense, AML has an inﬂuence on law enforce-
ment methodologies, from drugs to grand corruption. Thus, in the
U.K. regime since the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002, the government
has the power to require offenders to provide details of their incomes,
expenditures, and assets (for up to twenty years following a conviction)
in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act of 2005, investigators
can place monitoring orders on suspected offenders’ accounts that pro-
spectively allow them to track funds movements and to require forfei-
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ture of cash over £5,000 inland as well as at borders unless the suspect
can convince the court that the funds were legitimately acquired.78
The paucity of cases against stand-alone launderers and investiga-
tions that have their origin in money-laundering information supports
the criticism that the AML regime has brought in few new offenders.
There are no systematic data on the origins of cases against major
criminals such as principal drug dealers, so it is impossible to tell
whether more of them are being captured through money-laundering
laws and investigations. Furthermore, where heads of state or their
families are involved in grand corruption (including embezzlement and,
sometimes, illicit trafﬁcking and other major crimes also), it is far from
obvious to whom either domestic or foreign institutions should report
without fear of retaliation, or who has sufﬁcient motivation to take
serious action. In this respect, the national FIU model, like most na-
tional crime investigation and prosecution models, breaks down when
confronted with key elites, even where they have no formal immunity
for acts performed in ofﬁce.79
F. Costs
Whatever the gains from money-laundering controls, there are also
a variety of costs that need to be considered. Reuter and Truman (2004)
offer a very rough estimate of $7 billion for the costs of the U.S. AML
regime in 2003. That ﬁgure includes costs to the government ($3 bil-
lion), the private sector ($3 billion), and the general public ($1 billion).
However, it does not include two potentially important cost elements:
the effect on the international competitive position of business sectors
subject to AML rules or the costs of errors. The banking industry has
complained substantially about the former from time to time, though
less so as FATF has helped increase formal regulation of the ﬁnancial
sector in other money centers. The second is of particular concern for
vulnerable populations such as immigrant workers who may be ex-
cluded from ﬁnancial services because of a general suspicion based on
their background.
Studies by KPMG (2003) and PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2003) for
78 In December 2005, Prime Minister Blair announced the intention to lower the
threshold for this sort of forfeiture to £1,000.
79 This is not uniquely a problem for the countries of the South, especially Africa:
recent scandals have engulfed Prime Minister Berlusconi (Italy), President Chirac
(France), and—at a more modest level—former German Chancellor Kohl. In the wealth-
ier as well as some poorer countries, many of these scandals involve campaign ﬁnance.
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the U.K. NCIS and the Financial Services Authority, respectively, pro-
vide a partial cross-check for these estimates. The KPMG study pro-
vides a “rough estimate” of the current cost of the U.K. SARs regime
for reporting entities of £90 million: a ﬁgure that may be expected to
rise as more sectors are covered by the money-laundering regulations,
though some costs may represent initial start-up rather than recurrent
costs. If we scale this ﬁgure by the size of the U.S. economy relative
to the size of the U.K. economy and convert from sterling to dollars,
the corresponding estimate is $1.1 billion. Since reporting of SARs is
an important but not the only element of the AML regime, this rough
estimate suggests that a ﬁgure of $3 billion for the entire U.S. regime
is not unreasonable as an upper-bound estimate.80 Since those reports,
there has been a rise in demand for compliance ofﬁcers and escalating
use of expensive software that tries to identify “suspicious transactions”
on the basis of pattern analysis.
The two studies for the U.K. authorities also looked at costs to the
government. The KPMG study of the SAR regime estimates these
costs at only about 12 percent of the costs to reporting institutions, to
which we would add that this ﬁgure should rise as increasing use is
made of SARs following subsequent legislation and critical perfor-
mance reviews. However, that ﬁgure should not undercut the Reuter
and Truman guesstimate of the rough equality between the overall
costs of the U.S. AML regime to the government and private-sector
institutions. Many government costs with respect to prevention, such
as drafting regulations and conducting examinations, are unrelated to
the actual management of information ﬂows. As already noted, the
United States is also far more active than the United Kingdom in
prosecutions. Moreover, the Reuter and Truman estimate of total U.S.
federal prevention costs is only about one-ﬁfth of the total prevention
plus enforcement costs.81
G. How Risky Is Money Laundering?
However crude, an estimate of how risky money laundering in the
United States has become as a result of the AML regime is helpful in
80 The British Bankers Association estimates that British banks spend $400 million
annually on AML compliance (Economist 2005).
81 The PriceWaterhouse Coopers study estimates that the cost to the government of
the expanded retrospective CDD would be a minuscule amount (0.3 percentage points)
of the total cost to ﬁrms. This low ﬁgure is understandable because the change in the
AML regime applies principally to the reporters and the cost to the government involves
only handling additional reports, and not even, e.g., what might be done with the reports.
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assessing regime performance. About 2,000 people are convicted of
money-laundering offenses (primary or otherwise) each year in the
United States. For the moment, assume that all of those convicted are
providers of, rather than customers for, the service. This assumption
imparts an upward bias to our risk estimate, since we know that some
(perhaps even a majority) of those convicted are not stand-alone pro-
viders of money-laundering services.82
To estimate risk, a ﬁgure for the total number of persons who laun-
der money is also needed. No such estimate is available, so an indic-
ative calculation is all that can be offered. Assume that total U.S. do-
mestic crime money laundered annually is near the low end of
conventional estimates, say $300 billion. Only 20 percent of those con-
victed are reportedly involved with laundering more than $1 million,
but that is the amount involved in the speciﬁc transactions detected,
not an annual ﬂow. If an average money launderer handles $10 million
per year (which might generate a gross income of $500,000 to $1 mil-
lion), then there would be 30,000 money launderers, and the proba-
bility of conviction would be about 6.7 percent (2,000/30,000). Of
course, some of the launderers will be (or work for) very large ﬁnancial
institutions such as those almost all readers bank with. This institu-
tional size factor should be borne in mind when thinking about vio-
lation rates, since different people within the institutions may uncon-
nectedly be doing the laundering. For comparison, there are estimates
available that the probability of incarceration for selling cocaine in the
late 1980s was approximately 25–30 percent (Reuter, MacCoun, and
Murphy 1990). Though dated, these are the only such estimates for
an illegal market. There remains, however, a further problem that the
enforcement authorities have not highlighted. Even if the probability
of conviction is as high as we hypothesize here, the proportion of those
assets that are recovered is remarkably low.
This exercise is highly speculative; there are other assumptions that
might generate a higher estimate of risk without overly straining plau-
sibility. For example, in addition to those who were convicted of money
laundering, there may be substantially more individuals for whom
those charges were dropped in exchange for information about the
predicate offense or for pleas to some other involvement in the pred-
82 Data on the educational level of those convicted federally for money laundering show
that fewer than one-half had more than a high school education. It seems likely that
these are customers rather than providers themselves.
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icate offense, even though the individual’s principal role was money
laundering. If only half of those who were caught laundering money
were convicted on other charges, then the risk ﬁgure might rise to 14
percent. For money launderers with valuable legitimate labor market
skills, that risk might generate a very high premium for their services.
Compared to street-hardened drug dealers with little education or high
social standing to lose, such professionals require a higher incentive to
risk the same amount of prison time.
These assumptions generously favor a ﬁnding that supports the ef-
fectiveness of the AML regime. Most of those convicted of money
laundering are also convicted of other offenses, and many are probably
customers rather than providers. The assumption that each money
launderer handles an average of $10 million per year imparts a similar
bias; actual cases point to launderers with much lower volume. That is
certainly the case if many of them work for only one client. It is quite
plausible that even now, with an elaborate regime in place, money laun-
derers face a less than one in twenty probability of incarceration in the
United States.83 The ﬁnancial penalties collected by the federal gov-
ernment represent the most modest of taxes, even assuming low-end
estimates of money laundering.
However, it must be reemphasized that this is not a complete as-
sessment of the effectiveness of the AML regime. The ﬁgures em-
ployed cover only those individuals who were themselves involved di-
rectly in the money-laundering transaction. It may well be that SARs
and other elements of the regime generate useful evidence against
larger numbers of drug dealers, but that the ﬁnal indictments and con-
victions are for the predicate crime alone. The lack of information on
this possibility is a major omission in the current system of data col-
lection.
V. Conclusions and a Research Agenda
Led most prominently by the United States, developed and many less
developed nations have now put in place an elaborate set of controls
on the ﬁnancial system that aim to deter a variety of criminal activities
by making it difﬁcult to convert illegal proceeds into safely usable
83 We assume that the set of actual current money launderers is smaller than it would
have been if laundering had been subject to a less strict penal and regulatory regime.
This estimate is based around those who are actually acting as launderers.
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funds. The system has expanded recently with global concerns about
terrorism. There is good reason to believe that it will expand still fur-
ther in the next few years as some kinds of ﬁnancial transactions that
facilitate laundering are still, at best, lightly regulated, and these will
be seen as “gaps” that need to be closed.
How well the system works in suppressing crimes and preventing
terrorist acts is entirely a matter of speculation. No published papers
make any claims to provide an empirical assessment. Nor are we aware
of any ongoing research to that end. This is an important gap, given
that the controls are expensive, can create problems for individuals
falsely identiﬁed as involved in laundering, and require private insti-
tutions to take on (unpaid) an important and unconventional law en-
forcement role, for which their customers and shareholders pay.
It is easy to critique the system for its elaborateness and intrusiveness
(Naylor 2002); at the same time, for its lack of success in rooting out
major criminals or recovering a large percentage of crime proceeds
(Naylor 2002; Nelen 2004; van Duyne and Levi 2005); and for its
impact on distorting the classical constructions of criminal law (All-
dridge 2003). Some critics might choose to have the best of both
worlds, simultaneously deriding the lack of serious impact on pro-
claimed targets and the invasion of privacy, perhaps even suggesting
that there may be a wider political motivation for enhancing transpar-
ency. This suspicion of Big Government is held by libertarians at either
end of the left-right political continuum, especially in North America
(Hyde 1995; Levy 1996; Naylor 2002; Alldridge 2003) and in offshore
ﬁnance centers, whether or not underpinned by economic interests.
There are horror stories of both kinds of errors. First are those in
which the system unfairly penalizes the apparently innocent, especially
before the U.S. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1999. Examples
include forfeiture of entire farms on which a small amount of cannabis
has been grown or raids on incorrectly suspected persons to generate
large asset forfeitures that fund state or federal agencies. In the terrorist
ﬁnance area, much controversy still exists on the freezing of money
transmission businesses run by the Sudanese Al-Barakaat on the basis
that they were linked to Bin Laden.84
84 The issue of nonjusticiability of decisions to designate (and not to designate) persons
and institutions as ﬁnanciers of terrorism is a broader important issue that we merely
ﬂag here. However, given the asset freezing and ﬁnancial incapacitation consequences of
thus designating, say, Hamas or not designating some prominent Saudis, it is easy to see
why such decisions are problematic. Is feeding and clothing the families of suicidebombers
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Second are those in which it transparently fails to catch the most
guilty till long after the money laundering has occurred, if at all. While
troubling, these kinds of stories cannot by themselves make an effective
case against the regime. They must be weighed against beneﬁts that
are much less conspicuous and very difﬁcult to assess.
Defenders of the system offer instances of serious malefactors caught
violating AML rules; see, for example, the ﬁve National Money Laun-
dering Strategies published under U.S. Congressional mandate between
1999 and 2003. Such instances, even when aggregated, also fail to make
the case. For example, it is never made clear how many of the offenders
would have been caught through their violation of other substantive
criminal statutes. Gold and Levi (1994), following up a large sample
of SARs to the U.K. NCIS, made an early attempt to analyze the
beneﬁts. They concluded that at that time, many reports were made
after the banks learned of customs or police interest; that the customs
and police usually used the SAR information only when they already
were suspicious of the account holder; and that therefore it was im-
possible to ascertain the potential of the “system” to generate impor-
tant leads. Moreover, the proportion of reports that generated any sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁt to prosecutions and conviction-based asset conﬁscation
was under 1 percent of reports made. Despite electronic reporting,
given the huge increase in the number of reports made, it seems likely
that the current percentage that leads to law enforcement (as con-
trasted—because of increased resources—with tax) beneﬁts will be sub-
stantially lower today.
In light of this, we offer no conclusions about how well the system
currently performs. Instead we ask what criteria should enter into de-
cisions about extending the system? That allows us then also to discuss
some plausible research activities that would permit better decision
making.
The existing system of regulation is driven in part by scandal. The
Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal of the early 1990s
led to tougher regulation by the Bank of England and elsewhere in the
world. The Chiasso and Marcos scandals led to creative and proactive
approaches in Switzerland to both regulation and prosecution of over-
seas-originating crimes. The revelations about European bank holdings
after the fact “ﬁnancing terrorism”? E.U. member states, e.g., are far from united in such
judgments.
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of Sani Abacha’s fortune, entirely generated by kleptocratic activities
as a Nigerian general and unelected head of state, engendered a spate
of new rules from various national ﬁnancial regulatory agencies. The
Bank of New York scandal led to a major review of correspondent
banking relationships, as banks realized that they were responsible for
the due diligence (or lack of diligence) of the banks for which they
processed transactions.85 The Riggs Bank scandal (U.S. Senate 2004,
2005), among others, has led to a sharp tightening of regulatory activ-
ities by U.S. bank regulatory agencies since 2004.86
It may be true that these changes are aimed at sustaining and legit-
imating the world ﬁnancial system, but they also recognize “market
failure” in self-regulation. It seems to us that, populist reﬂexes to egre-
gious wrongdoing apart, the expansion of AML controls to all nations
represents an attempt to grapple with the dark side of globalization
without “unduly” disturbing the functioning of the world ﬁnancial ser-
vices industry, including overseas remittances that totaled $167 billion
in 2005 (World Bank 2006, p. 85).87
Overreaction can come from the regulated as well. In the United
States, the Beacon Hill case, in which JP Morgan Chase handled $6
billion for a money services business (MSB) (the Beacon Hill Corpo-
ration), has generated a great concern on the part of New York banks
about the business of MSBs. As reported in a Deloitte newsletter
(@Regulatory, June 2005), “Fearing that MSBs, who provide a valuable
service to the unbanked sector, would themselves lose access to the
banking system, FinCEN and the banking agencies attempted to send
85 Those banks that ﬁnd it uneconomic to seek formal listing or branches in foreign
jurisdictions pay other banks for clearing their transactions, e.g., in U.S. dollars.
86 A June 2005 newsletter from Deloitte Touche (@Regulatory) states that “the current
laser-like focus of the bank regulators has resulted mainly from certain high-proﬁle AML
cases which called into question the adequacy of the existing regulatory oversight infra-
structure for AML. As a result of these high-proﬁle cases, the U.S. Congress is applying
signiﬁcant pressure on the federal bank regulatory agencies to enhance their supervision
of banks’ AML programs or risk losing this authority. In turn, the bank regulators are
closely scrutinizing the banks’ AML programs.”
87 According to the World Bank’s review of Global Economic Prospects, “Although
there is no universal agreement yet on how tomeasure international migrants’ remittances
to developing countries, a comprehensive measure of certain ofﬁcially recorded ﬂows—
workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers—produced an
estimate of $167 billion for 2005, up from $160 billion in 2004. Given measurement
uncertainties, notably the unknown extent of unrecorded ﬂows through formal and in-
formal channels, the true size of remittance ﬂows may be much higher—perhaps 50
percent or more. Because of their volume and their potential to reduce poverty, remit-
tances are attracting growing attention from policymakers at the highest levels in both
developed and developing countries” (2006, p. 85).
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the message that banks should not ‘throw the baby out with the bath
water’ but rather establish anti–money laundering (AML) controls
commensurate with the higher inherent AML risk with MSB custom-
ers, including the varying levels of AML risk within this category of
customers.” No doubt the problem will be resolved. However, this
points to the difﬁculty of regulators meeting their multiple objectives,
even setting aside the more fundamental issue of whether we should
opt for a retributive deserts-based model, a “restorative justice” model,
or some “mixed economy of sanctions” approach that represents the
current spectrum of actual national systems within a global framework
that contains equivalent rather than exactly the same laws.88
How should decisions be made about the scope and intensity of
regulation? Creating a system that is truly comprehensive, that covers
all the methods by which the origins of criminal incomes could be
hidden or by which funds could be conveyed to terrorists, is too am-
bitious.89 It would impose a great burden on societies that place con-
siderable value on the free ﬂow of commerce and on individual and
commercial privacy. The system must be risk-based to take account of
the relationship between the attractiveness of a channel for these pur-
poses and the costs of subjecting it to monitoring. To do that, though,
requires ﬁrst a knowledge of how drug dealers and embezzlers cur-
rently launder funds and of how terrorists move moneys for their op-
erations and, second, how they respond to regulations and controls
aimed at speciﬁc channels.
Obtaining even the descriptive data for the ﬁrst task is a major un-
dertaking. The kind of ethnographic research that has led to a better
understanding of the lower levels of the drug trade (e.g., Bourgois
1995) is not likely to be so successful for an activity that has involved
a much smaller number of high-end offenders. However, there is a
small literature on the high end of the drug trade, relying mostly on
prison interviews, that has provided some insights (e.g., Reuter and
Haaga 1989; Adler 1993; Pearson and Hobbs 2001, 2003). Prison in-
terviews, along with a closer examination of case ﬁles, could be helpful
in understanding the money-laundering activities of some classes of
88 For some jurisdictions, neither punishment nor ﬁrm regulatory monitoring and sanc-
tioning take place.
89 This is the risk of setting out but not ranking a large number of vulnerabilities to
money laundering (U.S. Department of Justice 2006): it seems to make the assumption
that all vulnerabilities need to be removed, without undertaking any cost-beneﬁt judge-
ment about them.
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offenders. Terrorism ﬁnance represents a much greater research chal-
lenge since it involves national security considerations that make access
to both offenders and ﬁles much more limited.
To assess how felons respond to increased regulation and controls
requires modeling of counterfactuals. A small literature is starting to
emerge on this; for example, de Boyrie, Pak, and Zdanowicz (2001)
have shown that Swiss money-laundering controls generated increases
in the use of certain trade accounting (underinvoicing of imports,
overinvoicing of exports) to conceal the ﬂows of moneys.
Money-laundering controls are now a permanent part of the ﬁnan-
cial regulatory landscape in Western and most other societies. They
impose a new set of obligations on businesses to assist the government
in law enforcement and in the reduction of crime. They are worthy of
a serious research effort that they have not yet received.
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